

























Capital Flows, Capital Account
Regimes, and Foreign Exchange




POLITICAL ECONOMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE




Capital Flows, Capital Account Regimes,  




Department of Economics 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003 
Tel: (413) 545-6359;Fax: (413) 545-2921 





This draft: February 2003 
 
 
Acknowledgements: The original version of this paper was prepared for a project of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and presented at the workshop on “Management of 
Capital Flows: Comparative Experiences and Implications for Africa” held in Cairo on March 20-21, 2001.  
The author is grateful for constructive comments from Kamran Kousari and S.C. Kasahara.  The author 





This study examines capital flows and shifts in capital account and exchange rate 
regimes in African countries over the past two decades.  The evidence shows that official 
lending to Africa has declined while the volume of private capital flows remains low and 
significantly below the levels observed in other developing regions.  Private capital 
inflows to Africa are limited due to several factors, including the weakness of the 
macroeconomic environment, underdeveloped financial systems, high country risk, and 
exchange rate misalignments.  The focus of policy reforms must be on alleviating these 
constraints in order to attract more foreign capital and overcome the shortage of 
development financing.   
Many African countries have pursued reforms aimed at liberalizing their capital 
account and exchange rate regimes.  However, liberalization has not been accompanied 
by systematic gains income growth, price stability, and trade performance.  African 
countries must pay serious attention to the scope, speed, and sequencing of capital 
account liberalization to minimize potential adverse effects of openness.  It is desirable 
for countries to maintain selective discretionary control over capital movements and 
exchange rate markets in order to hedge against adverse shocks to the economy and to 
maintain macroeconomic and financial stability.  To attract foreign capital, any move 
toward capital account openness and exchange rate liberalization must be supported by 
reforms aimed at improving credibility of macroeconomic policy and establishing an 
investment-friendly environment.  These reforms will not only attract foreign capital but 
also encourage domestic investment. 
An important aspect of capital movements in Africa is the high level of capital 
flight.  There is an urgent need for policies to stem further hemorrage of capital from 
Africa and induce the repatriation of private capital held abroad.  This will require not 
only improvement of the macroeconomic conditions to ameliorate incentives for 
domestic investment, but also reform of the political and legal systems to improve 
accountability and credibility of economic policy. 
 






 Until recently, the economics literature paid relatively little attention to 
international private capital flows to Africa, with most of the discussion focusing on 
official aid (Kasekende et al 1999).  Recent studies have important empirical and policy 
issues associated with private capital flows to Africa, but research in this area is still 
severely constrained by the scarcity of data.  The existing data on capital flows to Africa 
are fragmented and inconsistent, which makes it difficult to assess the nature, the term 
structure (long-term vs. short term), and the sectoral distribution of foreign capital 
(Bhinda et al 1999).  As a result, it is still difficult to formulate consistent policy 
recommendations.   
This study investigates a number of issues related to capital account regimes in 
Africa over the past two decades.  First, recent studies have pointed out a “surge” of 
private capital inflows to Africa, especially in the 1990s (Bhinda et al 1999).  However, 
the volume of private capital flows is still small relative to domestic capital formation.  
Unlike in other developing regions, private capital flows to Africa have not increased 
enough to offset the recent decline in grants and official lending.  This study discusses 
some of the factors that constrain private capital inflows to African countries. 
Second, to varying degrees, African countries have pursued liberalization of their 
capital accounts.  In some countries, capital account transactions have been fully 
liberalized (see Appendix).  However, liberalization has not been accompanied by 
improvement in macroeconomic performance.  The economic situation in some countries 
(such as Kenya) has actually deteriorated under liberalization due to excessive speed and 
poor sequencing of liberalization.  While liberalization can attract international capital, 
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the process can also have adverse effects on the economy in the presence of structural 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
Third, the exchange rate regime shifts around the world have been characterized 
by a “hollowing out” of the middle of the exchange rate regime spectrum, where 
countries are moving from intermediate exchange rate regimes (pegged but managed, or 
‘soft pegs’) to either hard pegs or independently floating exchange regimes.  For African 
countries, however, the transition has been asymmetric, mostly involving countries 
moving from soft pegs to independently floating regimes with virtually no movement 
from soft to hard pegs.  Most countries still have a relatively weak economic base, 
underdeveloped financial systems, and a weak regulatory environment.  Given these 
conditions, the transition by African countries to independently floating exchange 
regimes is puzzling.   
Fourth, the establishment of the European Monetary Union and the adoption of 
the euro as the common currency in most of Europe have rejuvenated the debate over 
currency regimes.  Some scholars have suggested that given the increasing globalization 
of finance and trade, countries should abandon exchange rate management and adopt a 
strong currency as legal tender (see Berg and Borenzstein 2000; Calvo and Reinhart 
1999).  For African countries, this could involve dollarization or – with the creation of 
the euro – euroization, and possibly also the adoption of a strong African currency (e.g., 
the rand) or a regional currency.  This study discusses the benefits and costs that such a 
regime shift would imply for capital mobility and macroeconomic stability. 
Fifth, an important aspect of capital movements in Africa is the high level of 
capital flight.  According to recent studies, Africa as a region has the highest proportion 
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of private assets held abroad (as a percent of total assets or GDP) compared to other 
developing regions (Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo 1999).  Capital flight is pervasive in the 
severely indebted low-income countries, which at the same time are overburdened by 
high levels of debt (Boyce and Ndikumana 2001; Ndikumana and Boyce 2002).  Capital 
flight imposes high costs on African economies and must be regarded as an urgent matter 
of concern.  Capital flight can be interpreted as the outcome of portfolio choice as private 
actors seek to maximize returns on assets and minimize risk by holding their assets 
abroad.  Capital flight can also arise through illegal acquisition and use of national 
resources for private enrichment by private individuals and public officials.  Controlling 
capital flight will require not only improvement of the macroeconomic conditions to 
ameliorate incentives for domestic investment, but also reform of the political and legal 
systems to improve accountability. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the trends 
and patterns of capital flows to Africa over the past two decades and discusses the 
constraints to private capital inflows.  Section 3 highlights recent reforms of capital 
account regimes and discusses motivations for capital account restrictions in Africa.  
Section 4 discusses exchange rate regime transitions and the implications for capital 
mobility and economic performance.  Section 5 examines the motivations, advantages, 
and disadvantages of dollarization for African countries.  Section 6 presents some 
estimates of capital flight and discusses the conduits, causes, consequences of capital 
flight, and implications of capital account liberalization for capital flight.  Section 7 
summarizes and discusses some policy implications. 
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2. Capital flows: Recent trends and patterns 
a. “Surge” in FDI in Africa: an illusion? 
From 1990 to 1999, private net resource flows to all developing countries 
increased almost six fold, from $42 billion to about $239 billion (Global Development 
Finance 2000).  Private capital flows have increased substantially, bypassing official 
capital flows.  This “surge” in private capital flows to developing countries has been 
interpreted as a byproduct of global financial integration (World Bank 1997).  
International investors penetrate markets in the developing world in search for higher-
returns investment opportunities as well as a way of minimizing risk through portfolio 
diversification.  At the same time, recent economic reforms undertaken by developing 
countries have contributed to attracting private capital (Singh 1999; Singh and Weisse 
1998).  Financial integration is supposed to benefit developing countries by allowing 
them to tap the pool of global capital and achieve higher economic growth through 
improved resource allocation through financial markets (Fischer 1999). 
 At first glance, capital account movements in Africa share some similarities with 
these global trends.  The volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased 
substantially over the past decade.  Annual FDI inflows to Africa, excluding South 
Africa, increased from an average of $1.2 billion in the 1981-1985 period to $2.9 billion 
in 1986-1991, and $5.3 billion in the 1992-1998 period (UNCTAD 1995, 1998, 2000).  
However, from a closer look, the recent increase in FDI inflows in Africa is not as 
substantial as it appears. 
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FDI increase: not as extraordinary as it appears 
The apparent extraordinary increase in FDI inflows to Africa appears illusory.  The 
volume of FDI inflows to most African countries was extremely low until the early 1980s 
(Table 1).  For example, FDI inflows increased from $0.2 million in 1981-85 to $125 
million in 1992-98 in Zimbabwe, from $19 million to $108 million in Zambia, and from 
$8.5 million to $107 million in Ghana.  However, the appearance of a “surge” in FDI is 
only due to the fact that the initial levels were very low. 
 Moreover, FDI still makes a relatively small contribution to capital formation in 
African countries.  In the 1992-1998 period, the ratio of FDI inflows to gross domestic 
investment is less than 10% for 30 out of the 41 countries in the sample in Table 1 
(excluding countries with missing data) and less than 5% for 17 countries in the sample.  
The noticeable exceptions are Nigeria, Seychelles, and Zambia where the ratio is over 
20% and Angola and Lesotho, with ratios over 30%.  These countries also have high 
gross investment rates.  The gross domestic investment to GDP ratio for the 1992-98 
period is 23% for Angola, 77% for Lesotho, and 39% for Seychelles (World Development 
Indicators 2000).   
Shrinking share of FDI in Africa among developing countries 
Africa’s share in total FDI inflows to developing countries has declined since the 
second half of the 1980s, even as the absolute volume was increasing (Figure 1 and Table 
2).  In 1999, sub-Saharan Africa received only 4.3 percent of total FDI inflows to the 
developing world, down from an average of 10.5% in the 1981-1989 period.  It is clear 
that Africa has not substantially benefited from this global increase in capital flows as 
much as other developing countries.  The low levels of FDI to Africa cannot be fully 
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explained by rate of return considerations.  Rates of return to FDI in Africa are 
comparable to or even higher than those in other developing regions (Figure 2).   
The changing distribution of FDI across the continent 
FDI inflows to Africa have traditionally been concentrated in extractive industries.  
The top 10 beneficiaries of FDI inflows accounted for 82 percent of total FDI inflows to 
Africa (excluding South Africa) in the 1992-1998 period (Figure 3).  Oil exporters have 
been the primary beneficiaries of FDI inflows, but their share has declined over the years.  
In the second half of the 1980s, the group accounted for 70 percent of total FDI inflows 
to Africa.  The ratio was just 59% in the 1990s.   
 While the initial drive of FDI inflows to Africa was the extraction of primary 
resources, especially oil and mines, the motivation for foreign capital seems to be 
changing slowly.  Capital inflows are low, stagnating, and even declining in some oil 
exporters, such as Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon (Table 3).  At the same time, some 
“new comers” are attracting increasing attention from international investors (Figure 4).  
Noteworthy cases are Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  These 
are also among the African countries that have made significant progress in economic 
policy reforms over the last decade, which have contributed to price stability, fiscal 
discipline, improvement of the economic infrastructure, and the creation of a better 
environment for private investment.  There is also evidence that the returns to investment 
in extractive sectors are not higher than in the manufacturing sector (Figure 2), which 




b. Other capital flows to Africa 
 Private capital flows to developing countries have increased significantly relative 
to official capital flows over the last two decades.  The share of private capital flows in 
total net resource flows to all developing countries increased from 58% in 1980 to 82% in 
1999.  By comparison, over the same period, the ratio for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
increased only slightly from 37% to 41% (Figure 1). 
The volume of official capital inflows to SSA has also decreased since the 1980s.  
Net long term lending has declined both in absolute volume as well as a share of total net 
lending to all developing countries.  SSA’s share in grants has slightly declined although 
not as markedly as long-term lending.  The decline in official long-term lending and 
grants has not been compensated by any increase in private lending.  Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s share in long-term lending to developing countries declined from 17% in 1989 to 
just 3% in 1999.  The increase in FDI in Africa over the recent years is lower compared 
to other regions, while other private capital flows such as equity portfolio investment 
have in fact declined after reaching a peak in 1995 (Figure 1 and Table 2).  In 1999, 
portfolio equity investment in SSA was only $492 million in nominal terms compared to 
$1.1 billion for South Asia and $3.6 billion for Latin America and the Caribbean (Global 
Development Finance 2000).  After increasing substantially from 1992 to 1995 (from 
$153 million to $4.9 billion in constant 1995 dollars), the volume of portfolio investment 
in SSA has declined sharply since.  Private net resource flows declined from 1980 to 
1990 and increased thereafter while official net resource flows declined.  This resulted in 
a significant increase in the share of private net resource flows in total resource flows 
(Figure 1). 
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c. Constraints to private capital inflows in Africa 
 There are many constraints to the expansion of private capital inflows in Africa, 
including the weakness of the macroeconomic environment, underdeveloped financial 
systems, high country risk, and exchange rate misalignment. 
Weak macroeconomic environment 
 The weakness of the macroeconomic environment in African countries is a result 
of a range of factors, including low resource endowment, exogenous shocks, and 
misguided macroeconomic policies that have accentuated the adverse effects of 
exogenous shocks.  Economic performance has been dismal in many countries, especially 
since the 1980s (see Collier and Gunning 1999a, 1999b).  However, evidence shows that 
countries that have consistently pursued economic reforms aimed at redressing economic 
imbalances have experienced an improvement in economic performance, which has 
increased investor confidence.  This may explain the recent increase in foreign capital 
inflows in countries like Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda (see Table 3). 
Underdeveloped financial systems 
The level of sophistication of the financial system is an important determinant of both 
the ability of a country to attract international capital and the ability of the financial 
system to withstand shocks to global capital flows.  With the exception of a few countries 
(South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, and probably Kenya, Mauritius, and Nigeria), most 
African countries have underdeveloped financial systems.1  The following features are 
especially worth emphasizing: 
                                                 
1 For further discussion of financial development in Africa, see Ndikumana (2001), Gelbard and Leite 
(1999), Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998), and Mehran et al. (1998). 
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• Size and depth: In most African countries, financial systems are still shallow.  With 
the exception of South Africa, African financial markets offer a limited range of 
financial products.  Bank lending is predominantly short term, government securities 
are mostly of short maturity, banks in many countries do not issue credit cards (issued 
in only 15 sub-Saharan countries in 1997), and inter-bank lending is still 
underdeveloped (Gelbard and Leite 1999). 
• Low stock market development: The majority of African countries do not have active 
stock markets, and most of the active stock markets are still small and illiquid, 
including long-established stock markets, such as the Egyptian Stock Exchange 
(Ndikumana 2001).   
• Poor performance: African banking sectors are still characterized by inefficiencies in 
credit allocation and poor loan repayment enforcement mechanisms, which result in 
high proportions of non-performing loans.  Gelbard and Leite (1999) report an 
average share of non-performing loans of over 20 percent in a sample of 38 sub-
Saharan countries in 1997. 
• Weak regulatory and supervision framework:  The institutional environment for 
financial development is still inadequate in many African countries.  Some of the 
basic requirements for effective banking supervision (e.g., modern banking laws, 
central bank autonomy) and prudential regulation (e.g., establishment and 
enforcement of minimum bank capitalization ratios, deposit insurance) are still non-
existent in many countries (Gelbard and Leite 1999; Mehran et al 1998; Nissanke and 
Aryeetey 1998). 
 10
In the context of adjustment programs, some countries have made significant progress in 
reforming their banking systems.  In particular, countries are establishing new banking 
laws or reforming existing ones to improve supervision and prudential regulation.  
Moreover, the participation of the state in the banking sector has decreased as a result of 
the privatization of state-owned banks and the easing of licensing requirements, which 
have accelerated the creation of new private banks.  To the extent that these reforms are 
supported by market friendly macroeconomic policies (especially fiscal discipline and 
non-inflationary monetary policy), they will enhance investor confidence and attract 
more foreign private capital. 
High country risk 
 Africa has traditionally been considered as being “atypically risky” and a “capital-
hostile environment” (Collier and Pattillo 2000: 3).  Surveys reveal that, in the opinion of 
investors (foreign as well as local), the most important obstacles to investment are fear of 
political instability and the risk of policy reversal.  Weak and volatile macroeconomic 
fundamentals also contribute to high country risk.  These include high and variable 
inflation rates, exchange rate instability, and chronic fiscal deficits.  Another important 
factor of high investment risk in Africa is effective distance as perceived by international 
investors, which is influenced by geographic distance, transactions costs, and 
cultural/psychological distance.  African countries can improve their risk ratings through 
sustained economic reform.  It should be noted, however, that international rating 
agencies tend to rate Africa as being riskier than is warranted by objective conditions 
(Haque et al. 2000).  As a result, the impact of economic reforms on risk rating for a 
particular country may be retarded by a “bad neighborhood” effect.   
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3. Capital account regimes: openness and related issues 
a. Recent developments in capital account policies 
Towards greater openness 
In the context of the macroeconomic reforms initiated in the 1980s and 
accelerated in the 1990s, many African countries have moved towards greater capital 
account openness by abolishing or relaxing existing capital controls.  The text in the 
appendix and Table A2 contains a summary of important recent reforms for some 
countries.  The following is a non-exhaustive sample of recent reforms in the current 
account regimes. 
• Limitations to foreigners’ participation in domestic investment have been relaxed and 
even abolished in some countries.  However, governments have maintained controls 
in strategic sectors, like crude oil and gas in the case of Nigeria. 
• Countries have relaxed or abolished restrictions on nonresidents’ ability to repatriate 
dividends, interest income, as well as proceeds of sales or liquidation of the initial 
investments.   
• Investment by residents in foreign-currency denominated assets locally and abroad is 
now allowed in a number of countries.  However, even in countries with relatively 
liberal regimes, some limitations are maintained for strategic reasons.  For example, 
in South Africa, the government maintains a limit on the amount of investment 
abroad by residents.  Corporations can invest up to R250 million within the SADC 
region (no limits for Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland) and R50 million elsewhere.  
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Institutional investors are allowed to invest abroad up to 15 percent of their assets, 
while the maximum allowed for individuals is R750,000. 
• Recent reforms have allowed nonresidents to purchase stocks and government 
securities.  Kenya and South Africa are the leading reformers in capital account 
liberalization. 
Liberalization in the context of regional arrangements 
 Liberalization of capital account regimes has also accelerated in the context of 
new or existing regional arrangements.  With the exception of the CFA zone, which is an 
integrated monetary union, African regional arrangements have traditionally emphasized 
trade integration.  Recently countries have pursued greater capital mobility .  A 
noteworthy example is the Cross-Border Initiative in Eastern and Southern Africa (CBI) 
(see Fajgenbaum et al 1999).  However, in the case of overlapping regional arrangements, 
economic incentives can be distorted when obligations under the various bodies are 
inconsistent.  For example, it is not clear how countries that belong to both the CBI and 
the SADC can reconcile discrepancies in tariff arrangements since some of these are 
different in the two bodies.  Harmonization of obligations across regional entities is 
necessary to allow countries to take full advantage of regional integration. 
Scope, speed, and sequencing of liberalization 
Three important points are worth emphasizing with respect to recent capital 
account liberalization in Africa.  First, despite the visible trend towards liberalization 
there is still a wide diversity in capital account openness across the continent.  Some 
countries have very open capital accounts, such as Kenya and South Africa, with few 
restrictions on FDI and other capital account transactions by individuals and firms.  In 
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other countries, transactions are tightly controlled, including restrictions based on the 
sectoral allocation of FDI (see Table A2). 
Second, countries must pay serious attention to the scope, speed, and sequencing 
of capital account liberalization to minimize potential adverse effects of openness.  
Evidence shows that speedy liberalization results in macroeconomic instability, 
generating effects that are opposite to the intended objective of liberalization.  Kenya is a 
compelling example on this issue.  Facing imminent crisis at the end of the 1980s, the 
Kenyan government embarked on an aggressive reform agenda including the opening of 
the capital account and liberalization of the foreign exchange market.  However, the crisis 
continued throughout the 1990s, as a result of severe macroeconomic imbalances.  
Capital account liberalization ultimately increased the country’s vulnerability to 
fluctuations in capital flows, especially by providing ‘legal’ channels of capital flight 
(Ariyoshi et al. 2000: 67). 
 Third, to attract foreign capital, capital account openness must be supported by 
broad-based macroeconomic reforms aimed at improving the investment environment.  
Countries must especially pursue fiscal discipline, responsible monetary policy 
committed to price stability,2 and institutional reforms aimed at fostering a legal and 
regulatory environment that is conducive to financial intermediation.  There is evidence 
that countries that have made progress in economic and institutional reform and improved 
credibility of macroeconomic policy are also attracting the attention of international 
investors. 
 
                                                 
2 Commitment of monetary policy to price stability does not necessarily amount to surrendering the right of 
national authorities to use monetary policy to respond to exogenous shocks.  The idea is to foster 
disciplined discretion in monetary policy, especially by shielding monetary policy from fiscal pressures. 
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b. Motivations for capital account restrictions in Africa 
Why liberalize the capital accounts? 
 Proponents of capital account liberalization have advanced two main arguments in 
favor of liberalization (Fischer 1999).  The first argument is that capital account 
liberalization is an “inevitable step on the path of development which cannot be avoided 
and should be embraced” (Fischer 1999: 2).  Historical evidence demonstrates, so the 
argument goes, that the most advanced economies have open capital accounts.  The 
second and arguably more powerful motivation for capital account liberalization is that 
the potential benefits of liberalization outweigh the costs.  Potential benefits include 
increased access to a larger and more diversified pool of funds by investors (local and 
foreign), resulting in higher opportunities for portfolio diversification.   
 However, even proponents of capital account liberalization acknowledge 
important risks associated with liberalization (Fischer 1999: 2-3).  International capital 
flows – especially short term capital – tend to be highly volatile and capital reversals are 
costly.  Capital markets tend to react erratically following shocks to the economy.  
Through contagion and spillover effects, capital market shocks tend to spread quickly 
across countries, often irrationally, reflecting herd behavior.  The risks associated with 
capital account openness are particularly high for countries with weak macroeconomic 
fundamentals, underdeveloped financial systems, and poor banking regulatory 
institutional infrastructure.  African countries should therefore exercise great caution in 




Capital controls vs. capital restrictions 
 The literature on the management of international capital flows has focused 
primarily on the desirability and the effects of capital controls.  However, as Cooper 
(1999) points out, capital controls are a subset of a larger set of policy options for 
managing international capital flows.  Capital controls are typically quantitative 
limitations on capital flows.  There are, however, administrative and price penalties on 
capital movements that may have similar effects as capital controls.  These include 
differential reserve requirements on assets and tax preferential treatment of certain 
categories of capital deemed favorable for economic growth (such as FDI as opposed to 
short-term portfolio equity investment).  Therefore, countries have more than the option 
of imposing or not imposing capital controls.  They can also select and sequence various 
strategies in order to manage the volume and distribution of capital inflows as well as the 
volume of capital outflows.   
The debate over capital restrictions is almost ironic in the context of African 
countries.  Because capital inflows are still low, one may argue that African countries 
need to attract capital inflows, not to control them.  However, there are good reasons for 
an activist approach to capital account management in African countries.  The conditions 
for full liberalization of capital movements are very hard to meet and they are largely 
lacking in most African countries.  These conditions include low barriers to international 
trade, a well developed, a well diversified and well regulated financial system, and no 
large differences between the country’s and world’s tax regime on capital (Cooper 1999: 
124).  The following is the list of some of the reasons why African countries should 
selectively impose some restrictions on capital flows. 
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Argument #1: Protecting domestic financial systems. 
A surge in international capital inflows can destabilize domestic financial 
systems.  This is particularly the case for short-term capital flows, which have a high 
propensity for quick and sudden reversal.  Given that financial systems are still 
underdeveloped in most African countries and that the regulatory framework is still 
weak, it may be necessary to adopt a selectively activist approach to capital account 
management.  For example, South Africa suffered from contagion effects from the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-98.  The contagion effects worsened investor sentiments, causing 
large capital outflows and a depreciation of the rand.   
Argument #2: Shaping industrial growth 
The evidence shows that private capital inflows to African countries still 
primarily target extractive activities, which contributes to perpetuating the dependence on 
the primary sector.  Because extractive activities are predominantly capital intensive, 
capital inflows in those areas have little contribution to employment creation.  It is 
desirable to design policies that can redirect foreign capital into new growth-promoting 
activities.  Such policies include imposing a minimum stay requirement on foreign 
capital, establishing differential reserve requirements by type of capital in favor of 
growth-promoting capital, and providing preferential tax treatments to foreign capital that 
is directed to new employment-creating and growth-promoting activities.   
Argument #3: Redistributive capital restrictions  
In Africa as in other developed and developing countries, the participation in 
capital markets is heavily skewed in favor of the wealthiest segments of the population.  
The majority of citizens are bystanders who derive little benefits from financial market 
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booms while they often bear disproportionately high costs of financial fragility.  African 
countries can devise policies aimed at redistributing the gains from capital markets 
expansion, which can contribute to improving the living standards of the population.  For 
example, taxation of capital gains with the aim of increasing funding for socially 
productive public investment (health, education, nutrition, etc.) can have significant 
progressive effects.   
Argument #4: Protecting  export performance 
Unregulated capital flows can result in sharp fluctuations of exchange rates that 
can damage export performance.  If high capital inflows result in the appreciation of the 
national currency, this will discourage international demand for national exports while 
encouraging imports of foreign goods, which depresses the current account balance.  For 
emerging market African countries as well as others that have experienced a substantial 
increase in capital inflows, national authorities must consider options for activist 
management of capital flows to minimize potential adverse effects of capital flows on 
trade.   
 
4. Exchange regimes: transitions and implications for capital mobility 
a. The global context: regime shifts and the “hollowing-out” of the middle 
 Recent studies have observed marked shifts in exchange rate regimes around the 
world.  These shifts are characterized by a “hollowing out” of the middle of the exchange 
rate regime spectrum where countries are moving from intermediate regimes (“soft 
pegs”) to very hard pegs and independently floating regimes (Fischer 2001; Mussa et al. 
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2000; Calvo and Reinhart 2000).3  These developments have been interpreted as the 
natural outcome of the increasing global integration of finance and trade.  The recent 
crises that have hit emerging market economies in recent years have motivated research 
on the connections between the chances and severity of capital account crises and the 
exchange rate regimes.  Some scholars have concluded that with few exceptions, these 
crises have had the most severe effects in emerging market countries that had either 
explicitly fixed exchange rate pegs or where movements in exchange rates were 
artificially constrained.  In contrast, as the argument goes, emerging market countries that 
allowed flexibility of exchange rates fared better during crises (Mussa et al. 2000: 21).   
 It is still not clear whether the recent experience of emerging market crises 
constitutes evidence for a causal relationship between financial crises and exchange rate 
regimes.  The nature of the exchange rate regime is nonetheless relevant because it can 
determine the ability of a country to hedge against a crisis and the magnitude of the crisis 
may depend on the particular exchange regime in place.  In practice, however, sorting out 
the effects attributable to the exchange rate regime is difficult, partly because in many 
cases, financial market disturbances only amplify the effects of shocks that originate from 
the real side or from fundamental domestic policy misalignments.  Recent experience 
shows that fiscal crises (like in Russia and Brazil), the weakness of the domestic financial 
system and excessive foreign currency-denominated borrowing in the corporate sector 
(like in Korea), the loss in competitiveness of the export sector, and other changes in the 
fundamental aspects of the economy have been central causes of financial crises.  It is 
                                                 
3 The hard pegs category includes regimes with a currency board or arrangements with no special legal 
tender; the soft pegs category includes other conventional fixed pegs, pegged rates in horizontal bands, 
crawling pegs, and pegged rates with crawling bands; the independent floats category includes 
independently floating and managed float with no pre-announced exchange rate path (Fischer 2001). 
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nevertheless the case that for countries that are significantly integrated in the global 
financial markets, the choice of the exchange rate regime matters.  In particular, such 
countries may find it costly to maintain rigidly fixed exchange rates. 
 
b. Exchange rate regime shifts in Africa: Asymmetric transition 
Many African countries have liberalized their foreign exchange markets and 
moved away from soft pegs towards independently floating or managed floating 
exchange rate regimes (see Table A1 in the appendix).  However, these transitions have 
been asymmetric.  While countries have moved out of the middle of the exchange regime 
spectrum, there has been virtually no movement out of or into the category of hard-peg 
regimes (Table A1 and Figure 5).  Out of 51 African countries, 53% were classified as 
having soft peg regimes in 1991.  In 1999, only 24 percent of the countries are in this 
category.   
Exchange rate regime transitions in Africa have mostly consisted of a movement 
of countries out of the soft pegs category (especially “conventional fixed pegs”) into 
independent floats.  Only Guinea-Bissau moved from the soft peg category to the hard 
peg category.  The transition matrix in Table 4 indicates that over 55 percent of the 
countries (15 out of 27 countries) that were in the soft peg category in 1991 had adopted 
an independent floating regime by 1999.  In contrast, no shifts – with a single exception 
of Namibia which shifted from a hard peg to a soft peg – occurred among countries in 
both extremes of the exchange regime spectrum.  The countries in the hard pegs category 
in 1999 are older members of the CFA zone – again except for Namibia – and Guinea-
Bissau which joined the CFA zone in 1997.  Similarly, all nine countries in the 
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independent float category in 1991 were still in the same category in 1999.  The existing 
evidence on African countries is inconclusive as to the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of alternative exchange rate regimes.  I discuss some of the findings below. 
 
c. Exchange rate regimes and economic performance: casual observations 
It is difficult to establish a definitive relationship between economic performance 
and exchange rate regimes in Africa for many reasons.  First, the classification of 
countries along the spectrum of exchange rate regimes from very hard pegs to 
independently floating regimes is arbitrary.  Second, while the level and fluctuations in 
exchange rates can affect economic performance, it is only one of the many interrelated 
factors that determine a country’s economic outcomes.  Therefore, sorting out the effects 
that are attributable to shifts in exchange rate regimes is difficult.  Sophisticated 
econometric analysis can help to address this issue, but such an exercise is not attempted 
in this study; for this reason, the following observations are rather casual and should not 
be interpreted as definitive empirical regularities. 
Tables 5 and 6 present some indicators of economic performance for African 
countries classified by exchange rate regime.  The results show that performance 
indicators vary widely within exchange rate regime categories.  The information is 
summarized in Table 7, which presents the percentage of countries in each category 
whose economic indicators improved in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. 
 For the majority of countries in the hard pegs category (CFA zone members), 
there was little improvement in the growth of per capita GDP from the 1980s to the 
1990s.  While 50% of the countries in this group had a positive growth rate in the 1990s, 
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the growth rate was higher than in the 1980s for only 36% of the countries in this 
category.  Inflation was higher and trade was lower in the 1990s compared to the 1980s 
for 71% of the countries in this group.   
However, two important empirical facts are worth emphasizing for the CFA zone.  
First, countries in this group experienced much lower inflation rates than countries in the 
other groups both in the 1980s and the 1990s.  Virtually all the countries in the hard peg 
group had single-digit inflation rates (except for Guinea-Bissau, which joined the CFA 
zone in 1997).  Second, as the data in Table 8 show, countries in the CFA zone 
experienced some improvement in economic performance following the devaluation of 
the CFA in 1994.4  The growth rate of GDP per capita was higher in 1995-98 than in 
1990-94.  The average growth rate for the group was 2.3% per annum in 1995-98 
compared to -2.8% in 1990-94.  Exports also were higher in 1995-98 for all the countries 
in the group, the export-to-GDP ratio averaging 36% in 1995-98 compared to 28% in 
1990-94.  No similar patterns are observed in other regional groupings on the continent 
(see Table 9 for the case of the SADC).5 
 In the soft pegs category, a larger proportion of countries (82%) achieved positive 
GDP growth, although growth was positive and higher in the 1990s than in the 1980s for 
only 36 percent of the countries in this group.  This group also experienced improvement 
in inflation (lower in 82 percent of the countries) and the current account balance 
                                                 
4 See the text in the appendix for a brief history of the CFA zone and its operational structure.  Also see 
Honohan and Lane (2000) and Guillaumont, Guillaumont, and Plane (1988) for quantitative analyses of 
economic performance in the CFA zone.  The finding of low inflation in countries with fixed peg regimes 
is consistent with the results from existing cross-country studies (see Ghosh et al. 1997). 
5 The choice of the year 1994 to split the 1990s decade for the SADC group is primarily for comparison 
purposes with CFA zone countries.  For South Africa, 1994 is historically important as it marks the end of 
the apartheid era, so this year is a natural break point for this country. 
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(improved in 60 percent of the countries), and international reserves (higher stock of 
reserves in 80 percent of the countries).   
 The proportion of countries with improvement in GDP growth is lowest in the 
independent floats category.  Inflation is higher in more than half of the countries in this 
group (54%).  However, the majority of the countries in this group show greater 
performance in trade (73%) and international reserves (85%).   
 In examining the links between exchange rate regimes and economic 
performance, the group of countries that shifted from one regime to another may provide 
better information than those countries whose regimes remained unchanged over the 
investigation period.  Looking at the group of countries that shifted from soft pegs to 
independent floats, the shift was not associated with much gain in terms of output growth 
while inflation and current account records are worse than in the three categories of ‘non-
shifters.’  However, this category has the highest proportion of countries with improved 
performance in trade and international reserves. 
 Overall, these casual observations reveal no systematic relationship between 
indicators of economic performance and patterns of exchange rate regime shifts.  The 
transition toward floating regimes was not accompanied by much gain in GDP growth, 
while inflation and current account performance worsened for the majority of regime 
shifters.  In the case of CFA-zone countries, the re-alignment of the CFA exchange rate 
in 1994 was followed by significant improvements in output growth and trade.  Due to 
ill-advised delayed adjustment in the exchange rate of the CFA franc, price stability was 
achieved at the cost of lower output growth and lower trade performance.  Much more 
 23
empirical work is needed to establish empirical regularities about the relationship 
between economic performance and exchange rate regimes in African countries.   
 
d. Further issues related to exchange regimes 
The exchange rate as a nominal anchor 
As African countries move to liberalizing their exchange rate regimes, they 
confront some important policy questions.  In particular, under a flexible exchange rate, 
the exchange rate no longer plays the role of a nominal anchor of monetary policy.  
National authorities must then determine a credible alternative nominal anchor.  One 
alternative is to target inflation.  This option appears to have worked fairly well in 
industrialized countries.  However, important institutional conditions are necessary for 
this alternative to work.  In particular, successful inflation targeting requires a high 
degree of instrument independence of the central bank.6  Monetary policy must be free 
from fiscal policy pressures and political intrusion.  Moreover, inflation targeting requires 
a sound information base in forecasting inflation and output.  These conditions are 
generally not met in a typical African country.  Furthermore, inflation targeting is 
difficult when the economy is hit frequently by supply shocks.  The majority of African 
economies experience frequent supply shocks, which include both domestic shocks 
(natural disasters, such as drought) and international shocks (like energy crisis and 
commodity price shocks).  These effects can be hard to disentangle, which makes it 
                                                 
6 Instrument independence of the central bank refers to the freedom to choose the monetary policy 
instruments needed to meet given macroeconomic objectives.  Goal independence means the central bank’s 
freedom to set the ultimate goals of monetary policy.  In practice, independence of the central bank is 
generally limited to instrument independence. 
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difficult to determine whether inflation is the outcome of policy mistakes or the result of 
purely exogenous shocks or a combination of these factors. 
No exchange regime is good for all, all the time 
 When the economy is predominantly subject to real/supply shocks, a rigidly fixed 
exchange regime can be destabilizing as it prevents the normal adjustment of the current 
and capital accounts to the shocks.  A number of scholars support the following 
prescription: “if shocks are mostly real, float; otherwise fix” (Calvo and Reinhart 1999; 
Berg and Borenzstein 2000).  In some ways, the experience of the CFA zone lends some 
support to this view.  Failure to adjust the exchange rate as the economies in the zone 
were hit by exogenous real shocks (terms of trade shocks, energy crisis, etc.) proved to be 
costly for these economies.  However, as Calvo and Reinhart (1999) indicate, in some 
recent crises, shocks have come through the capital account, thus containing real as well 
as nominal components.  African countries that opt for fixed exchange rate regimes 
should preserve enough flexibility to respond to shocks in a timely manner by adjusting 
the official exchange rate. 
 Many scholars have argued that along the spectrum of exchange rate regimes, 
running from very hard pegs to freely floating regimes, those in the intermediate range 
(or soft pegs) are not viable beyond the short term (Obstfed and Rogoff 1995; Mussa et 
al. 2000; Fischer 2001).  For countries that are significantly integrated in the world 
financial markets, so the argument goes, the only viable option is a flexible (possibly 
managed) exchange rate regime.  However, for African countries that are not integrated 
in the international financial markets, a hard peg seems to be a very sensible option.  The 
recent transition of African countries towards floating exchange rate regimes is puzzling.  
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Except probably for the emerging market countries (Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and South 
Africa), African countries do not seem to have the institutional and infrastructure 
conditions required to benefit from fully flexible exchange regimes.   
 
5. Currency regimes, dollarization/euroization, and implications for capital flows 
a. Dollarization/euroization: the new context 
The increasing interest in the topic of currency regimes and dollarization (and 
euroization more recently) is, to a large extent, motivated by the changing international 
environment, which has cast doubt on the adequacy of many of the traditional policy 
prescriptions with regard to the management of international trade, foreign exchange 
markets, and international capital flows.  Here, I emphasize three of the important new 
developments that have changed the international context of policy making in the domain 
of currency regimes.   
 The first change in the global environment is the fact that inflation crises around 
the world have abated significantly since the early 1990s.  The argument for activist 
exchange rate management has traditionally involved the need to use the exchange rate as 
a means towards inflation stabilization.  With the decline and stabilization of inflation in 
many countries, the argument for using exchange rate management as a stabilization tool 
has lost momentum.  However inflation is still an important problem for many African 
countries.  In light of this, there is good reason for exchange rate management to remain a 
core component of the agenda of economic stabilization. 
 The second factor is the recent surge in cross-border capital mobility around the 
world.  This development has rejuvenated the debate over the choice of the exchange rate 
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regime.  Two views have emerged on this subject.  The first view (the bipolar view) is 
that only very hard pegs and independently flexible exchange rate regimes are viable in 
the financially integrating world (see Fischer 2001).  The second view suggests that 
countries should simply abandon national currencies and adopt a strong and stable 
international currency, especially since in today’s global capital markets, it is unwise to 
peg the exchange rate because it is too costly to defend.  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995: 74) 
suggest that “for most countries, it is folly to try to recapture the lost innocence of fixed 
exchange rates.” Calvo and Reinhart (1999: 13) echo the proposition by arguing that “the 
limited effectiveness of capital controls provides the basis for reassessing the relative 
merits of fixed and flexible exchange rate policies.  Dollarization may offer emerging 
market economies a viable and more market-friendly alternative to capital controls.”  We 
briefly discuss the advantages and disadvantages of dollarization further below. 
 The third factor is the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the 
adoption of the euro.  The question is whether the creation of the EMU will spark more 
interest for the strengthening of monetary unions in Africa, the creation of new ones, and 
even the establishment of a continent-wide African monetary union (AMU). 
 
b. Advantages and disadvantages of dollarization/euroization 
Advantages of dollarization 
Proponents of dollarization have advanced a number of advantages that countries 
may derive from adopting a strong foreign currency.  Here we elaborate on four of these 
advantages (see Berg and Borensztein 2000 for more details).7  The first benefit from 
                                                 
7 Note that the arguments in favor of or against dollarization discussed here apply for the case of 
euroization. 
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dollarization is that it shields the national economy from the adverse effects of sharp 
fluctuations in exchange rates.  The second advantage of dollarization is to raise 
international investors’ confidence in the economy by lowering the risks arising from 
currency fluctuations, which stimulates capital inflows.  Dollarization also reduces the 
spread between domestic and international interest rates by lowering domestic interest 
rates, which stimulates private domestic investment.   
However, critiques of dollarization point out that while dollarization eliminates 
currency devaluation risk, it does not eliminate country-specific or sovereign risk.  In 
fact, it may even increase sovereign risk in countries that are not fully dollarized (Berg 
and Borensztein 2000).  In the case of African countries, sovereign risk is likely to 
remain high due to weak economic fundamentals, loose macroeconomic policies, and a 
turbulent political environment.  Dollarization or euroization cannot be an insurance 
against fundamental political uncertainty or the adverse effects of bad macroeconomic 
policies. 
The third alleged advantage of dollarization is to facilitate integration into the 
world economy.  Integration would be facilitated especially by reducing uncertainty and 
transaction costs associated with the divergence in cross-country exchange rates.   
Finally, proponents of dollarization argue that it can serve as an external agent of 
fiscal and monetary discipline and foster sound financial policies.  The adoption of a 
foreign currency amounts to surrendering the option of monetary financing of 
government deficits as well as the possibility of using monetary policy for 
macroeconomic stabilization.  However, evidence suggests that currency unions are not 
an antidote to fiscal indiscipline or political intrusion in the financial system.  The 
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experience of the CFA-zone countries in the 1980s is revealing on this point as discussed 
further below.   
Disadvantages of dollarization 
There are many disadvantages of dollarization, of which four are emphasized 
here.  The first disadvantage of dollarization is the loss of a national currency.  This is 
likely to meet political resistance because a national currency is a symbol of national 
sovereignty.   
Second, dollarization implies a loss of seignorage revenue, that is, the resources 
created from printing interest-free cash in exchange for government securities.  The 
adoption of dollarization or euroization implies that all the seignorage revenue accrues to 
the USA or the EMU members, which amounts to free credit by the dollarizing countries 
to the USA or the EMU countries with the exception of the provision of these currencies 
through official development aid.  In principle it is possible to design a scheme through 
which the USA or the EMU can share the seignorage revenues with members of the 
currency zone, but as of today, there are no clear guidelines for the design of such a 
scheme. 
 The third disadvantage of dollarization is its high degree of irreversibility, or the 
lack of an ‘exit option’.  Unlike other currency arrangements (such as a currency board) 
where countries can elect to exit whenever they see fit, the costs of exiting from 
dollarization are rather prohibitive (Berg and Borensztein 2000).  The reintroduction of a 
national currency is possible, but it is likely to absorb substantial administrative and 
logistical resources.  Most importantly, it is likely that the new currency will be perceived 
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as weaker than the dollar (or the euro), which, among other things, will adversely affect 
investor sentiments and probably depress capital inflows while fueling capital outflows. 
 The fourth disadvantage of dollarization is that the country relinquishes a large 
part of its macroeconomic policy autonomy by losing three important policy tools: 
devaluation as a tool of current account and capital account management, the lender-of-
last-resort function of the central bank, and monetary policy as a tool of macroeconomic 
stabilization.  With respect to the lender-of-last-resort function, the inability of national 
authorities to intervene to protect the financial sector against adverse internal and external 
shocks is a high price to pay for dollarization.  It is possible to argue that the increased 
presence of highly capitalized foreign banks that is likely to accompany dollarization can 
serve as an alternative potential rescue mechanism in the event of a liquidity crisis in the 
domestic banking sector.  Another alternative rescue mechanism would be direct 
intervention of the central bank of the guarantor country (the USA or EMU countries).  
However, this leaves open the question of whether the penetration of foreign banks is 
necessarily desirable and whether the USA or EMU countries have the incentives to 
intervene to rescue troubled financial institutions in the dollarizing/euroizing country.   
 
c. Currency unions in Africa: opportunities and constraints 
 In this subsection, I explore three questions related to currency regimes in Africa.  
First, are currency areas or monetary integration the means towards greater trade 
integration?  One of the potential advantages of currency unions is to foster trade among 
members of the zone.  However, the evidence from African countries shows that currency 
unions and regional integration in general have not promoted trade.  For example, intra-
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zone trade in the CFA zone represented about seven percent of total external trade of 
CFA countries for the 1994-2000 period, down from about 8.9% between 1970 and 1993 
(Hadjimichael and Galy 1997: 30)8  Low intra-regional trade in sub-Saharan Africa is due 
to a range of structural constraints, including lack of complementarity in production 
across countries and weak infrastructural linkages. Therefore, the adoption of a common 
currency in Africa will not necessarily increase intra-regional trade.  
Second, are currency unions a means towards fiscal discipline, efficiency, and 
stability of the financial system?  In principle, transferring financial and monetary policy 
to a supra-national institution can foster financial stability by reducing political pressure 
on credit allocation.  However, the evidence from the CFA zone is not compelling in this 
regard either.  The operating structure of the CFA zone, which delegates monetary and 
financial policies to the two regional central banks, did not insulate the economies from 
fiscal indiscipline and intrusive manipulation of credit allocation by member 
governments, especially through lending to state-owned enterprises, regional 
organizations, and government suppliers (Honohan and Lane 2000).  These loans were 
characterized by very high default rates.  As a result, the banking system was in severe 
crisis by the mid-1980s.  African countries cannot count on successfully “outsourcing” 
fiscal and monetary policy by simply delegating it to regional monetary organizations.  
Nor can they expect dollarization or euroization to be a substitute for fiscal and financial 
reform.   
Third, can currency unions foster international capital inflows?  The creation of a 
currency union is expected to be accompanied by an expansion of markets and possibly a 
                                                 
8 The average for 1994-2000 is computed using data from Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2001. See 
Yeats (1999), Aryeetey et al. (1996) and Asante (1997) for in-depth discussions of trade and regionalism in 
Africa. 
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reduction of country risk, which would increase international capital inflows.  One 
potential negative effect is that with the expansion of the markets, African economies 
may no longer be “below the radar screen of international speculators” (Honohan and 
Lane 2000).  This implies a need for efficient management of capital flows to reduce the 
risk of financial fragility. 
 
6. Capital flight: magnitude, causes, and macroeconomic implications 
a. Magnitude of the capital flight problem in African countries 
 The problem of capital flight from African countries has attracted much attention 
for a while in the academic literature (for a survey, see Boyce and Ndikumana 2001; 
Ndikumana and Boyce 2002; Ajayi and Khan 2000).  Existing studies show that African 
countries have experienced massive capital flight over time.  This paper presents 
estimates of capital flight for a sample of 30 African countries for the period from 1970 
to 1996.  These estimates are obtained using the methodology developed by Boyce and 
Ndikumana (2001) who compute capital flight as follows: 
itititititit MISINVRESCADFIDEBTADJKF +∆+−+∆= )( ,  
where DEBTADJ∆  is the change in debt adjusted for cross-currency exchange rate 
fluctuations, taking into account the fact that a country’s debt is denominated in various 
currencies; DFI is direct foreign investment, CA is the current account balance, RES∆  is 
the change in the stock of international reserves, and MISINV is net trade misinvoicing.  
Two modifications are made to the value obtained with the above equation.  First 
nominal values of capital flight are deflated to real values using the US producer price 
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index (base 1996 = 100).  Second, the accumulated stock of capital flight is computed by 
imputing interest earnings to past capital flight using the US Treasury Bill rate.   
Table 10 presents capital flight estimates for 30 sub-Saharan African countries.  
The table contains estimates of total real capital flight from 1970 to 1996 in constant 
1996 US dollars (column II), the stock of accumulated capital flight including interest 
earnings on past capital flight (columns III-V), and calculated net external assets (column 
VI) obtained by subtracting the stock of external debt in 1996 from the stock of 
accumulated capital flight with imputed interest earnings.   
 The results indicate that for the 30 African countries, real capital flight over the 
26-year period amounted to about $182 billion.  Including interest earnings, the 
accumulated stock of capital flight is $272 billion for the period.  Total capital flight is 
higher if we consider only severely indebted low-income countries (SILIC).  For this 
group, the estimates are $189.7 billion and $281 billion for total real capital flight and the 
accumulated stock of capital flight, respectively.  The sample as a whole is a “net creditor 
to the world” in the sense that private assets held abroad as measured by capital flight 
exceed total liabilities as measured by the stock of debt.  Estimated net external assets 
amount to $81.7 billion for the entire sample of 30 African countries and $102.7 billion 
for the SILIC group.   
 The magnitude of capital flight varies significantly across African countries.  
Angola, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria have 
particularly high levels of capital flight, with as much as $86.8 billion for Nigeria.  The 
capital-flight/GDP ratio exceeds 200% for 9 countries in the sample.  The data also 
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indicates a high per capita burden of capital flight amounting to several multiples of per 
capita income (comparing columns I and V in Table 10).   
 
b. Conduits, causes, and macroeconomic consequences of capital flight 
 There are various conduits through which private actors can channel capital flight 
abroad illegally.  Capital flight occurs through illicit bank transfers, embezzlement of 
exports of minerals and other natural resources, and misinvoicing of exports and imports.  
The amounts are notoriously high for some countries, including Nigeria with $23.6 
billion, the DRC with $7.4 billion, and Côte d’Ivoire with $6.7 billion (Boyce and 
Ndikumana 2001). 
 Some studies have investigated the causes or determinants of capital flight using 
both cross-country data and country case studies.  Ndikumana and Boyce (2002) examine 
the determinants of capital flight from 30 sub-Saharan Africa.  They find that external 
borrowing is positively and significantly related to capital flight, suggesting that to a 
large extent capital flight is debt-fueled.  Their results also indicate that capital flight 
exhibits a high degree of persistence in the sense that past capital flight is correlated with 
current and future capital flight.  The growth rate of per capita GDP and an index of voice 
and accountability are negatively related to capital flight.  The findings in Ndikumana 
and Boyce (2001) are consistent with the results from studies on smaller samples as well 
as country case studies.  These include Lensink, Hermes, and Murinde (2000) who find 
that capital flight is higher in countries with high corruption, bad governance, and high 
political instability.  Olopoenia (2000) finds that capital flight from Uganda was higher 
during the periods of political and economic instability in the 1970s and the first half of 
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the 1980s.  Nyoni (2000) finds that the black market premium, which is an indicator of 
market distortions, significantly and positively influences the level of capital flight.  
Lensink, Hermes, and Murinde (1998) find that capital flight declines following financial 
liberalization, indicating that reducing market distortions can contribute to reducing 
capital flight.   
Compared to other developing regions, sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a 
relatively higher level of capital flight.  Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo (1999) find that 
Africa has the highest proportion of private capital held abroad (as a percentage of total 
private assets or GDP).  Using a portfolio choice approach, these authors find 
econometric results suggesting that high capital flight from Africa was due, among other 
things, to overvalued exchange rates, high country-specific risk, and high indebtedness. 
 Capital flight implies a high opportunity cost for the economy and a heavy burden 
on the population.  High capital flight implies that scarce resources are used to channel 
private assets abroad instead of financing imports of investment equipment or 
consumption goods.  Capital flight also puts pressure on the exchange rate by increasing 
the demand for foreign currency to funnel wealth abroad.  Past and current capital flight 
constitutes a drain on national resource, and thus reduces the current and future growth 
potential of the country.  Capital flight contributes to increasing macroeconomic 
uncertainty, which depresses lending and investment.  Market participants may interpret 
high capital flight as a signal of loss of control of economic policy by national authorities.  
Through herd effects, capital flight can lead to more capital flight as agents seek to 
minimize expected portfolio losses in the face of an uncertain future political and 
economic environment. 
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c. Capital account liberalization and capital flight 
 The net effects of capital account liberalization on capital flight are unpredictable.  
Capital account liberalization can lead to a decline in capital flight due to the removal of 
market distortions.  However, capital account liberalization can curtail capital flight only 
if it is part of a broader reform agenda aimed at fostering an environment that is 
conducive to investment.   
Capital account liberalization when financial markets are repressed 
Three issues are worth emphasizing with regard to capital account liberalization.  
First, capital account liberalization has adverse effects when financial markets are 
repressed.  If domestic interest rates are significantly lower than foreign interest rates due 
to financial repression, then profit-maximizing savers prefer to hold their wealth in 
foreign assets.  Substantially repressed interest rates can lead to disintermediation as 
savings are channeled abroad while banks refuse to lend at negative real interest rates.  
The implication of this highly stylized argument is that African countries must coordinate 
their capital account liberalization programs with financial reforms to eliminate interest 
rate repression.  There is some evidence that financial liberalization can in fact play an 
important role in curtailing capital flight (Lensink, Hermes, and Murinde 1998). 
Second, the liberalization of capital account operations in the context of 
overvalued exchange rates can cause higher capital flight and can have detrimental 
effects on the current account.  An overvalued exchange rate induces agents to 
underinvoice exports while overinvoicing imports, which increases capital flight.  African 
countries need to coordinate capital account liberalization with exchange regime 
liberalization to avoid costly market distortions. 
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Third, political instability causes capital flight as agents seek to minimize the risk 
of expropriation and future portfolio losses due to political crisis.  Current account 
liberalization or any other economic reform would have little effect in reducing capital 
flight in the presence of high political uncertainty.  Therefore economic liberalization 
must go hand in hand with institutional reforms aimed at fostering transparent and 
accountable governance.   
 
7. Summary and policy implications 
7.1 Attracting and monitoring capital flows 
African countries need to design strategies to attract foreign private capital to 
compensate for the recent decline in official lending.  The evidence suggests that private 
capital flows are responsive to the macroeconomic policy environment.  The focus should 
be on reform policies aimed at improving fiscal discipline, controlling inflation, and 
creating an investment friendly environment.  Indeed countries that have made progress 
in economic reform have also experienced an increase in capital inflows (e.g., 
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda). 
Gauging the effects of capital flows on macroeconomic performance and 
designing appropriate policy responses requires good information on the nature, the 
magnitude, the sectoral distribution, and the variability of capital flows.  Unfortunately 
such information is still scarce in African countries.  African governments need to invest 
financial and human resources to establish mechanisms for systematic monitoring of the 
inflows and outflows of capital.  This could include the creation or strengthening of 
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specialized divisions within central banks and national bureaus of statistics whose 
mission would be to compile and disseminate information on capital movements.   
7.2 On liberalization and openness: a cautionary note 
Two points are worth emphasizing with regard to the recent moves towards 
greater flexibility of exchange rates and openness of capital account regimes in African 
countries.  First, liberalization of current and capital accounts will enhance economic 
performance only if it is supported by appropriate macroeconomic and sectoral policies, 
especially disciplined fiscal policy and monetary policy committed to price stability.  
Second, to avoid potential adverse effects of capital account liberalization, African 
countries need to undertake the necessary steps to reduce market distortions.   
7.3 Strengthening financial markets 
Underdeveloped financial markets constitute an important constraint to private 
capital inflows in Africa, especially because of the lack of opportunities for portfolio 
diversification.  At the same time, with underdeveloped financial markets and a weak 
regulatory infrastructure, African countries are ill equipped to absorb large and sudden 
surges in capital inflows.  Among other things, African countries need to pursue reforms 
aimed enforcing creditor and investor rights and improving the efficiency of the clearing 
system.  These measures will both facilitate financial development and encourage capital 
inflows. 
The role of stock markets in attracting private capital to Africa is a topic that 
deserves careful investigation.  The evidence shows that countries such as Kenya and 
Zimbabwe have failed to attract significant capital inflows despite the fact that they have 
long-established stock markets.  While stock markets can contribute to attracting private 
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capital, they are not a sufficient condition.  African countries need to pursue policies 
aimed at facilitating financial intermediation in general, which will promote the banking 
sector as well as equity markets.  A solid banking system is essential to the development 
of the stock market because stock market development and banking development are 
complementary (Levine and Zervos 1998). 
 Given the small size of African national stock markets (with the exception of 
South Africa), they are not yet in a position to attract sizeable foreign capital.  The 
development of regional stock exchanges can contribute to alleviating this small-size 
constraint.  The creation of national stock markets involves high costs (infrastructure and 
administrative costs) that small economies cannot afford in the short run.  Operating rules 
(accounting rules, prudential regulation rules, etc.) need to be coordinated across 
countries to facilitate cross-border listings and increase the benefit of regional integration. 
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Table 1: FDI inflows: volume (million $) and % of gross domestic investment, 1981-1998 
 
Country FDI inflows (annual average) FDI as % of gross domestic investment
 1981-85 
 
1986-91 1992-98 1981-85 1986-91 1992-98 
Algeria -7.9 8 9 0.0 0.0 0.1
Angola 278 169 420 22.5 14.4 33.3
Benin 0.5 3 16 0.3 1.3 4.6
Botswana 49.8 59 4 14.3 7.2 0.3
Burkina Faso 1.3 2 12 0.5 0.4 2.2
Burundi 0.5 1 1 0.3 0.6 0.9
Cameroon 158.9 -16 23 8.1 -0.7 1.6
Central African Republic 5.5 2 0 6.9 1.3 0.2
Chad NA 12 15 NA 11.2 7.9
Congo, Dem. Rep. -17.8 -10 2 -1.7 -1.0 0.3
Congo, Rep. 34 15 26 3.9 3.3 3.2
Côte d' Ivoire 33.7 49 187 2.4 4.9 14.5
Egypt 688.7 932 772 8.5 8.7 7.0
Ethiopia NA NA 62 NA NA 6.6
Gabon 64.3 53 67 5.0 4.1 5.3
Ghana 8.5 11 107 3.5 1.6 7.8
Guinea 0.2 18 12 NA 4.3 1.7
Kenya 15.9 35 20 1.3 2.2 1.4
Lesotho 3.9 11 198 2.8 3.8 32.0
Liberia 20.8 200 15 15.5 190.5 NA
Libya -272.2 45 -39 -3.3 NA NA
Madagascar 2.2 12 13 0.7 3.7 3.3
Malawi 7.6 15 26 3.4 5.3 8.7
Mali 4.3 NA 38 2.2 NA 6.8
Mauritania 8.9 3 6 4.2 1.3 3.0
Mauritius 3.4 24 25 1.5 3.8 2.4
Morocco 50.4 132 509 1.4 2.6 7.4
Mozambique NA 8 70 NA 2.4 13.7
Namibia NA 26 102 NA 6.8 16.2
Niger 3.1 16 14 1.2 5.9 8.9
Nigeria 400.3 728 1352 5.8 17.0 23.6
Rwanda 15.9 14 3 6.7 4.3 1.4
Senegal 8.2 13 54 2.7 2.1 6.8
Seychelles 10.1 20 34 25.2 28.1 20.4
Sierra Leone -2.2 -10 -1 -5.6 -12.3 -1.1
South Africa NA -27 965 NA -0.2 4.5
Sudan NA -4 94 NA -0.1 NA
Swaziland 6.9 53 22 4.4 37.0 6.7
Tanzania 8.8 NA 102 NA NA 8.9
Togo 6.9 10 21 4.3 3.8 10.4
Tunisia 207.6 83 474 7.6 2.9 10.0
Uganda NA NA 111 NA NA 14.2
Zambia 19.2 100 108 3.7 24.3 22.6
Zimbabwe 0.2 10 125 0.0 0.7 8.6
Sources: UCTAD, World Investment Report (1998 and 2000); UNCTAD (1995), FDI in Africa.
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1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
 
Volume 7055 4306 3705 3709 5245
 




Long term debt* 
Share (%) 
 
17.3 9.2 7.8 5.8 6.8 6.9 4.8 0.8 2.0 NA 3.0
Volume 10711 13048 11893 12091 10890 12396 11414 9989 9464 10274 10127Grants excl. tech.  
Coop. Share (%) 
 
49.8 41.7 29.7 36.0 36.6 36.6 34.9 36.5 37.3 37.8 38.3
Volume 5335 2361 2998 3377 3826 5835 4699 5399 6743 7540 8974FDI 
Share (%) 
 
16.8 6.5 6.9 6.2 5.0 5.4 4.2 3.8 3.9 4.2 4.3
Volume 0 0 0 153 183 891 4868 1967 1474 681 493Portfolio equity  
investment Share (%) 
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.3 2.4 13.5 4.1 5.0 4.4 1.8
Net private resource  
flows 
Volume NA 1377 NA NA 2887 5087 9501 5424 9396 3461 7264
 Share (%) NA 3.0 NA NA 1.7 2.8 4.6 1.9 3.2 1.3 3.0
 
Sources: World Bank, Global Development Finance (1997, 2000); UNCTAD, World Investment Report (1998, 2000).   
Nominal values are converted into real values using the US producer price index. 




Table 3: FDI inflows in selected African countries, 1986-1999 (million constant 1995 $) 
 
Country 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Oil exporting countries 
Angola 78 112 153 222 -360 712 307 317 176 472 177 403 1117 1803
Cameroon 24 15 78 0 -67 -16 31 5 -9 7 34 44 50 40
Congo 27 52 10 3 8 5 4 156 5 3 8 9 4 5
Egypt 1516 1150 1388 1389 788 271 489 517 1301 596 623 868 1080 1491
Gabon 137 109 155 -34 79 -59 135 -120 -104 -113 305 140 212 199
Nigeria 208 732 440 2092 631 762 955 1411 2030 1079 1558 1505 1054 1392
Tunisia 78 112 71 88 80 134 560 485 586 378 343 358 672 366
Others 
Botswana 87 138 47 47 41 -9 -2 -301 -15 70 69 98 90 111
Côte d'Ivoire 88 107 61 21 23 17 -246 92 122 268 295 440 315 277
Kenya 41 52 0 69 61 20 6 2 4 32 13 39 42 42
Lesotho 2 7 24 14 18 9 3 16 283 275 280 263 263 135
Mauritius 9 21 28 40 44 20 16 16 21 19 36 54 12 49
Mozambique 0 0 6 3 10 25 27 34 36 45 71 63 214 382
Seychelles 17 23 27 26 29 21 10 20 31 40 29 53 55 60
South Africa -66 -91 514 1517 1883 227 -45 -20 394 1241 800 3732 563 1368
Tanzania -10 -1 5 7 -3 3 13 21 52 150 146 155 172 182
Uganda 0 0 -5 -7 -16 1 3 58 91 125 117 171 211 179
Zambia 35 91 108 182 218 36 48 55 41 97 114 202 199 162
Zimbabwe 10 -38 -21 -11 -13 3 21 40 42 118 79 132 445 59
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (various editions 1992 to 2000).  Nominal values are converted into real values using the 
US producer price index. 
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Table 4. Exchange rate regime shifts in Africa from 1991 to 1999: Transition matrix 
 
1999 regime 










































The cells contain the number of countries (and percentage of the sample) transitioning from a 
given regime in 1991 to a regime in 1999. The ‘hard peg’ category includes regimes with a 
currency board or arrangements with no special legal tender; the ‘soft peg’ category includes 
other conventional fixed pegs, pegged rates in horizontal bands, crawling pegs, and rates with 
crawling bands; the ‘independent floats’ category includes independently floating and managed 
float with no pre-announced exchange rate path. 
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Table 5: GDP growth, current account, international reserves, and inflation in African countries by exchange rate regime, 1980-1998. 
 
Country/regime 1999 Growth of per capita GDP 
(annual %)* 
Current account balance 
(% GDP) 
Net international reserves 
(% GDP) 
Inflation (average % change, 
GDP deflator) 
 1980-89 1990-98 1980-89 1990-98 1980-89 1990-98 1980-89 1990-98
Group I. Hard pegs 
Benin -0.5 1.7 -6.6 -2.2 0.7 11.4 2.9 7.9
Burkina Faso 1.4 1.1 -2.1 -4.6 8.9 14.3 4.6 4.8
Cameroon 1.6 -2.1 -4.2 -2.7 1.3 0.1 6.2 4.8
Central African Republic -0.8 -0.6 -4.6 -5.6 7.5 14.4 9.3 4.2
Chad 3.9 -0.9 -0.6 -4.8 3.2 7.0 2.7 7.5
Congo, Rep. 0.9 -1.9 -13.1 -24.5 1.5 1.4 4.4 4.4
Côte d'Ivoire -2.9 0.6 -9.7 -5.4 0.1 3.1 3.5 6.2
Djibouti NA -5.3 NA -10.0 15.5 17.1 NA 4.1
Equatorial Guinea -1.4 14.3 -17.3 -37.0 3.4 2.1 -0.8 9.3
Gabon -2.9 0.7 -3.6 1.8 4.0 3.2 3.5 6.2
Guinea-Bissau 1.7 -1.2 -41.0 -21.1 6.2 6.7 57.7 41.3
Mali -1.8 0.8 -10.4 -8.7 1.7 13.1 5.3 7.6
Niger -3.6 -1.3 -7.7 -8.3 7.1 6.7 3.3 4.8
Senegal 0.3 0.2 -11.4 -5.4 0.3 4.0 6.7 4.4
Togo -1.5 -0.7 -4.9 -8.5 23.1 12.7 5.6 7.5
Group II. Soft pegs 
Botswana 6.4 1.7 0.3 6.8 56.9 102.0 12.7 9.2
Cape Verde 4.4 2.7 -1.2 -6.8 27.7 13.9 5.4 4.0
Comoros 0.3 -3.2 -9.8 -7.5 9.9 17.5 7.6 3.6
Egypt 2.8 2.2 -5.8 2.1 3.1 22.1 12.8 10.8
Lesotho 1.3 4.7 3.4 -9.8 15.4 42.2 13.8 8.1
Libya NA NA -1.8 NA 23.7 NA NA NA
Morocco 2.0 0.4 -5.4 -1.4 1.5 11.7 7.2 3.7
Namibia -1.8 0.8 NA 3.4 NA 6.0 13.6 9.0
Seychelles 2.6 1.4 -13.6 -7.9 6.2 5.7 4.2 1.6
Swaziland 3.3 -0.2 -6.5 -0.1 20.2 25.3 10.5 11.2
Tunisia 0.6 2.7 -4.8 -4.5 6.2 8.0 8.4 4.9
Zimbabwe -0.1 0.0 -2.0 -4.8 1.8 4.3 12.4 22.4
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Table 5 (continued): GDP growth, current account, international reserves, and inflation in African countries by exchange rate regime, 
1980-1998. 
Country/regime 1999 Growth of per capita GDP 
(annual %) 
Current account balance 
(% GDP) 
Net international 
reserves (% GDP) 
Inflation (average % 
change, GDP deflator) 
 1980-89 1990-98 1980-89 1990-98 1980-89 1990-98 1980-89 1990-98
Group III. Independent float 
Algeria 0.0 -1.0 -0.7 3.7 4.2 6.9 7.9 23.3
Angola 0.8 -3.2 -0.6 -4.3 NA 4.9 4.2 1254.1
Burundi 1.6 -5.6 -4.5 -4.0 5.3 14.7 4.3 11.1
Congo, Dem. Rep. -1.2 -8.4 -4.4 -8.4 1.8 1.7 63.8 4010.7
Eritrea NA 2.4 NA -5.6 NA NA NA 11.2
Ethiopia -2.1 2.6 -5.4 -6.4 2.2 7.2 5.4 8.2
Gambia 0.0 -1.0 -5.1 -0.9 4.5 24.5 16.6 5.3
Ghana -0.7 1.5 -2.7 -5.2 5.6 7.8 47.2 27.1
Guinea 1.7 1.5 -6.2 -5.5 NA 2.8 24.0 9.9
Kenya 0.5 -0.5 -4.9 -2.2 4.8 5.2 9.3 14.6
Liberia NA NA -0.9 NA 0.5 NA NA NA
Madagascar -1.9 -1.6 -7.2 -7.4 3.6 4.4 18.6 19.1
Malawi -0.8 1.0 -9.0 -15.4 4.5 7.0 15.3 29.0
Mauritania -2.8 1.3 -16.4 -1.8 10.6 9.4 9.8 5.1
Mauritius 5.0 3.8 -3.4 -1.7 9.3 22.5 9.6 6.7
Mozambique -2.6 3.2 -12.6 -16.0 4.3 10.9 41.7 38.2
Nigeria -2.3 -0.3 -1.6 0.9 6.0 11.3 18.9 33.9
Rwanda -0.7 -4.2 -4.4 -3.4 8.3 5.8 4.2 16.3
São Tome and Príncipe -1.0 -1.0 -33.9 -24.1 NA 18.6 30.2 53.4
Sierra Leone -2.1 -7.2 -3.3 -6.4 1.0 3.4 59.2 43.4
Somalia NA NA -15.5 NA 1.4 NA NA NA
South Africa -1.6 -0.2 0.8 0.1 0.7 1.5 15.1 11.4
Sudan -2.1 5.6 -5.7 -17.6 0.2 0.8 40.0 72.5
Tanzania 0.7 0.0 -7.0 -13.0 1.3 6.4 31.3 24.0
Uganda -0.1 3.9 -4.6 -9.9 1.6 6.2 116.5 20.1
Zambia -2.1 -1.7 -12.2 -13.6 3.3 5.8 39.0 75.0
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000; Fischer (2001); Mussa et al. (2000). 
The ‘hard peg’ category includes regimes with a currency board or arrangements with no special legal tender; the ‘soft peg’ category includes 
other conventional fixed pegs, pegged rates in horizontal bands, crawling pegs, and rates with crawling bands; the ‘independent floats’ category 
includes independently floating and managed float with no pre-announced exchange rate path. 
* The growth rate of per capita GDP is the time trend obtained from an OLS regression of log per capita GDP on time. 
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Group I.  Hard pegs 
Benin 334.3 426.9 NA 100.7 26.2 24.5 33.2 29.0
Burkina Faso 334.3 426.9 140.4 118.0 10.4 12.1 20.7 19.6
Cameroon 334.3 426.9 113.1 112.7 26.4 22.2 26.3 20.8
Central African 
Republic 
334.3 426.9 154.3 111.5 20.5 16.7 26.5 20.8
Chad 334.3 426.9 132.9 116.7 14.3 15.8 21.0 23.1
Congo, Rep. 334.3 426.9 91.3 98.8 52.0 57.4 52.3 60.7
Côte d'Ivoire 334.3 426.9 117.6 109.7 37.1 38.2 35.5 35.5
Djibouti 177.7 177.7 NA NA NA 44.9 NA 56.6
Equatorial Guinea 334.3 426.9 NA NA 35.9 59.1 50.2 82.2
Gabon 334.3 426.9 152.3 118.8 53.3 53.8 48.5 45.0
Guinea-Bissau 6.3 267.5 146.9 112.5 9.9 12.0 26.4 24.6
Mali 334.3 426.9 152.6 116.6 15.8 20.0 24.6 27.6
Niger 334.3 426.9 183.7 113.9 21.0 16.1 25.0 19.1
Senegal 334.3 426.9 136.8 113.3 28.7 29.6 34.7 32.7
Togo 334.3 426.9 130.5 106.3 46.1 31.6 49.7 35.3
Group II. Soft pegs 
Botswana 1.4 2.8 99.2 93.4 58.9 48.3 52.6 43.7
Cape Verde 69.8 80.3 77.9 94.5 15.5 17.4 30.0 34.7
Comoros 334.3 350.8 NA NA 14.7 18.5 31.3 30.1
Egypt 0.7 3.1 153.1 98.1 22.2 23.0 28.8 26.0
Lesotho 1.7 3.7 96.3 95.8 15.6 23.0 75.0 74.9
Libya 0.3 0.3 NA NA 54.7 NA 44.5 NA
Morocco 7.5 8.9 95.7 91.5 17.8 19.1 23.2 23.4
Namibia 1.7 3.7 104.8 93.0 58.6 53.8 62.2 57.3
Seychelles 6.3 5.1 90.2 94.4 62.1 59.7 63.3 63.9
Swaziland 1.7 3.7 101.6 91.4 70.7 83.0 77.5 85.2
Tunisia 0.7 1.0 91.4 93.3 36.9 42.4 40.0 44.7
Zimbabwe 1.3 8.9 156.7 96.3 21.4 33.1 21.8 34.6
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Group III.  Independent floats 
Algeria 5.1 36.3 245.1 117.2 23.8 26.0 23.0 25.4
Angola 0.0 83633.9 NA 55.1 34.7 59.2 30.2 56.9
Burundi 114.0 267.7 135.2 96.0 10.4 9.2 17.1 16.8
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.0 1370.2 220.9 120.2 21.4 22.6 21.8 21.8
Eritrea NA NA NA NA NA 27.8 NA 54.1
Ethiopia 2.1 4.9 189.0 139.2 9.3 10.5 13.0 15.1
Gambia 4.4 9.4 107.3 96.9 47.8 53.7 54.4 60.8
Ghana 82.3 1104.3 589.4 108.6 11.2 21.3 12.7 26.7
Guinea 196.2 952.9 NA NA 29.7 22.3 29.5 23.9
Kenya 14.3 47.1 103.9 92.3 24.7 31.4 26.9 32.7
Liberia 1.0 1.0 NA NA 47.3 NA 46.0 NA
Madagascar 725.8 3226.0 178.6 106.1 13.6 19.6 17.2 23.5
Malawi 1.6 11.2 146.6 130.1 23.9 24.8 27.3 31.2
Mauritania 64.8 122.4 128.9 110.9 42.2 42.8 52.9 48.4
Mauritius 12.3 18.0 98.7 93.9 54.6 62.0 56.2 64.1
Mozambique 183.2 6503.2 218.4 116.3 6.8 12.8 15.9 26.0
Nigeria 2.2 18.5 117.9 79.8 21.4 40.9 20.9 38.7
Rwanda 89.8 208.5 123.8 100.3 10.4 6.0 15.5 16.1
São Tome and 
Príncipe 
54.9 1250.6 NA NA 29.8 23.4 56.2 55.9
Sierra Leone 15.5 702.4 125.4 94.4 11.5 23.1 14.0 23.3
Somalia 93.7 NA NA NA 15.5 9.8 33.0 23.8
South Africa 1.7 3.7 96.7 94.3 28.3 23.3 25.9 21.9
Sudan 2.1 663.7 185.1 195.7 8.2 NA 12.8 NA
Tanzania 40.9 450.9 255.9 106.7 10.0 16.7 19.5 26.6
Uganda 39.9 978.8 334.5 88.9 11.6 9.6 14.7 15.4
Zambia 4.8 737.5 79.7 100.7 34.4 34.0 35.4 36.9
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2000. 
* The real exchange rate is computed as: (country’s CPI)/(USA’s CPI * Official exchange rate). 
** Average trade is the average of exports and imports as % of GDP. 
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Table 7: Exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic performance: Percentage of improved performance between the 1980-
1989 and the 1990-1998 period 
 
















 50.0% 35.7% 28.6% 92.9% 28.6% 50.0% 57.1%
Soft pegs 
 
 81.8% 36.4% 81.8% 72.7% 54.5% 60.0% 80.0%
Independent 
Floats 















70.0% 50.0% (30.0%) (20.0%) (88.9%) (40.0%) (100.0%)
 
This table summarizes information from Table 5 and 6.  Table A1 gives the information of countries that shifted from soft pegs to independent 
float used in this table.  Djibouti, Eritrea, Liberia, Libya, and Somalia are not included in this summary table due to missing data. 





Table 8: GDP growth, exports, and inflation in CFA countries, 1980-1998 
 
Country Growth of per capita GDP* Exports (% GDP) Inflation (average annual change 
of CPI index) 
 1980-89 
 
1990-94 1995-98 1980-89 1990-94 1995-98 1980-89 1990-94 1995-98
Benin -0.4 0.9 2.2 26.2 24.1 25.1 NA 19.5 7.1
Burkina Faso 1.4 -0.1 2.7 10.4 11.9 12.2 1.7 5.1 5.2
Cameroon 1.8 -6.4 1.8 26.4 20.0 25.0 9.0 6.6 6.7
Central African Republic -0.9 -3.0 1.3 20.5 15.4 18.3 3.7 3.5 5.7
Chad 4.0 -1.4 1.2 14.3 13.2 19.1 3.0 6.9 9.8
Congo 2.7 -2.9 0.1 52.0 49.8 66.9 7.6 11.6 10.6
Côte d’Ivoire -2.6 -2.9 3.7 37.1 33.1 44.7 5.9 6.7 6.4
Equatorial Guinea -1.9 2.6 31.7 35.9 39.3 83.9 NA NA NA
Gabon -1.5 -0.1 1.7 53.3 50.0 58.5 5.8 4.6 4.8
Guinea-Bissau 2.9 1.4 -5.6 9.9 10.0 14.5 70.5 44.7 38.3
Mali -1.5 -1.4 2.4 15.8 17.9 22.5 -0.1 3.8 6.0
Niger -2.9 -3.2 0.9 21.0 15.6 16.6 2.8 4.3 5.8
Senegal 0.3 -1.3 2.4 28.7 26.1 33.9 6.7 6.0 3.4
Togo 
 
-1.7 -4.0 2.1 46.1 29.8 34.0 4.2 8.2 7.6
Sample** -0.4 -2.8 2.3 31.7 27.9 35.6 6.1 6.2 6.3
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2000. 
* The growth rate in a period is the simple average of annual growth rates of real per capita GDP (constant 1995 $).   
** The sample growth rate of per capita GDP is the average growth rate of the population-weighted real per capita GDP.  The sample average 




Table 9: GDP growth, exports, and inflation in SADC countries, 1980-1998 
 
Country Growth of per capita GDP* Exports (% GDP) Inflation (average annual change of CPI index)
 1980-89 
 
1990-94 1995-98 1980-89 1990-94 1995-98 1980-89 1990-94 1995-98
Angola -0.1 -8.6 5.4 34.7 55.4 63.9 NA 876.1 3174.5 
Botswana 6.7 1.7 2.5 58.9 50.4 45.6 10.5 12.8 9.0 
Lesotho 2.0 2.6 4.3 15.6 18.8 28.2 13.6 13.6 9.3 
Mozambique -1.2 0.9 6.1 6.8 12.1 13.7 45.1 46.2 35.0 
Mauritius 5.0 4.2 4.3 54.6 61.0 63.3 7.7 8.6 6.6 
Malawi -1.3 -1.6 5.3 23.9 23.4 26.6 16.8 21.1 40.0 
Namibia -1.8 1.3 -0.2 58.6 52.7 55.2 13.0 12.2 8.3 
Swaziland 3.1 0.7 -0.1 70.7 79.8 86.9 14.7 11.1 8.5 
Tanzania 0.7 -0.2 0.8 10.0 14.0 20.1 30.1 28.9 19.6 
South Africa -0.9 -1.9 0.6 28.3 22.4 24.5 14.7 12.5 7.8 
Zambia -1.8 -2.7 -1.1 34.4 34.7 33.1 69.3 122.2 35.1 
Zimbabwe 
 
0.8 -0.3 1.5 21.4 27.9 39.6 13.6 26.5 23.6 
Sample** -2.9 -2.1 0.6 29.4 25.7 28.5 13.8 12.9 29.1 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000. 
* The growth rate in a period is the simple average of annual growth rates of real per capita GDP (constant 1995 $).   
** The sample growth rate of per capita GDP is the average growth rate of the population-weighted real per capita GDP.  The sample 
average export/GDP ratio and inflation rate are weighted by real GDP.  Excluding Angola, the sample average inflation rate for 1995-




Table 10: Indicators of capital flight from 30 sub-Saharan African countries, 1970-1996  
 
Cumulative capital stock  
              (III)                        (IV)               (V) 
Country GDP/capita 1996 
(I) 
Real capital flight 
(mill. 1996 $) (II) 
Stock (million 1996 $) % of GDP Per capita $ 
Net external 
Assets a 
   (VI) 
Angola 673 17032.5 20405.0 267.8 1803 9179.9 
Benin* 392 -3457.4 -6003.8 -271.9 -1067 -7598.1 
Burkina Faso 201 1265.5 1896.6 96.5 194 700.4 
Burundi 143 818.9 980.9 108.9 156 -146.0 
Cameroon 672 13099.4 16906 185.6 1248 7364.4 
Central African Republic 281 250.2 459.0 50.8 143 -482.1 
Congo DRC 130 10035.4 19199.9 327.1 424 6373.5 
Congo Rep. 959 459.2 1254.0 49.6 476 -3986.6 
Côte d’Ivoire 770 23371.0 34745.5 324.7 2502 15221.9 
Ethiopia 103 5522.8 8017.9 133.4 138 -2060.7 
Gabon* 5139 2988.7 5028.1 87.0 4469 717.7 
Ghana 395 407.3 289.3 4.2 17 -6152.9 
Guinea 586 342.8 434.2 11.0 64 -2806.1 
Kenya 330 815.1 2472.6 26.8 89 -4458.4 
Madagascar 291 1649.0 1577.5 39.5 115 -2568.3 
Malawi 132 705.1 1174.8 93.8 124 -971.3 
Mali 266 -1203.6 -1527.2 -57.5 -153 -4533.2 
Mauritania 469 1130.8 1830.0 167.4 786 -572.2 
Mauritius* 3792 -267.8 465.9 10.8 411 -1351.7 
Mozambique 175 5311.3 6206.9 218.4 382 -1359.4 
Niger 210 -3153.1 -4768.9 -247.7 -521 -6392.1 
Nigeria 308 86761.9 129661.0 367.3 1132 98254.4 
Rwanda 209 2115.9 3513.9 249.9 522 2470.8 
Senegal* 544 -7278.1 -9998.2 -214.9 -1168 -13661.1 
Seychelles* 6632 566.5 1032.3 203.4 13487 884.3 
Sierra Leone 196 1472.8 2277.8 257.1 505 1072.7 
Sudan 265 6982.7 11613.7 161.1 428 -5358.3 
Tanzania 191 1699.1 6203.4 106.3 203 -1158.4 
Uganda 306 2154.9 3316.1 54.8 168 -358.3 
Zambia 461 10623.5 13131.2 354.9 1637 5491.8 
Sample 311 182222.3 271795.4 172.8 538 81756.6 
SILIC onlyb 286 189670.4 281271.1 201.1 576 102765.5 
 
Sources: For SILIC countries: Boyce and Ndikumana (2001), including revisions of the data for the DRC for 1990-96; For other countries: author’s 
computations using the methodology developed in Boyce and Ndikumana (2001). The sample period varies by country depending on data availability. 
* Countries with an * are not SILIC countries (per World Bank’s classification as of December 1998).   
a  Net external assets = accumulated capital flight (with interest earning) minus stock of debt.   
b Prior to 1998, Kenya was classified as SILIC.  In this table, it is included in the SILIC sample statistics for comparison purposes with earlier studies on capital 
flight from SILIC, which included Kenya in this group (Ajayi 1997; Boyce and Ndikumana 2001). 
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Category 1991 Regime 
1999 
Category 1999 Currency 
peg, 1999 
Benin NS/CBA Hard peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Burkina Faso NS/CBA Hard peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Cameroon NS/CBA Hard peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Central African 
Republic 
NS/CBA Hard peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Chad NS/CBA Hard peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Congo, Rep. NS/CBA Hard peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Côte d’Ivoire NS/CBA Hard peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Djibouti NS/CBA Hard peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Equatorial Guinea NS/CBA Hard peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Gabon NS/CBA Hard peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Guinea-Bissau CP Soft peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Mali NS/CBA Hard peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Niger NS/CBA Hard peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Senegal NS/CBA Hard peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Togo NS/CBA Hard peg NS/CBA Hard peg French F 
Botswana FP Soft peg FP Soft peg Basket 
(SDR, rand) 
Cape Verde FP Soft peg FP Soft peg Escudo 
Comoros FP Soft peg FP Soft peg French F 
Egypt FP Soft peg FP Soft peg USD 
Lesotho FP Soft peg FP Soft peg Rand 
Libya HB Soft peg HB Soft peg SDR 
Morocco FP Soft peg FP Soft peg Basket 
(USD, SDR, 
₤) 
Namibia NS/CBA Hard peg FP Soft peg Rand 
Seychelles FP Soft peg FP Soft peg Basket (euro, 
yen, ₤, USD, 
Singapore $, 
rand)  
Swaziland FP Soft peg FP Soft peg Rand 
Tunisia CP Soft peg CP Soft peg CP 
Zimbabwe FP Soft peg FP Soft peg USD 
Algeria FP Soft peg MF Independent 
float 
MF 
Angola FP Soft peg IF Independent 
float 
IF 
Burundi FP Soft peg MF Independent 
float 
MF 





Eritrea   IF Independent 
float 
IF 









Category 1991 Regime 1999 Category 1999 Currency 
peg, 1999 
Gambia   IF Independent 
float 
IF 










Kenya FP Soft peg MF Independent 
float 
MF 
Liberia FP Soft peg IF Independent 
float 
IF 
Madagascar FP Soft peg IF Independent 
float 
IF 
Malawi FP Soft peg MF Independent 
float 
MF 





Mauritius FP Soft peg IF Independent 
float 
IF 










Rwanda FP Soft peg IF Independent 
float 
IF 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
CP Soft peg IF Independent 
float 
IF 





Somalia CP Soft peg IF Independent 
float 
IF 





Sudan FP Soft peg IF Independent 
float 
IF 
Tanzania FP Soft peg IF Independent 
float 
IF 
Uganda FP Soft peg IF Independent 
float 
IF 






Source: Fischer (2001); IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2000. 
Acronyms: CP = Crawling pegs; FP = other conventional fixed pegs; HB = pegged rate in horizontal band; 
IF = independently floating; MF = managed float with no pre-announced exchange rate path; CB = rates 
within crawling bands; NS = Arrangements with no separate legal tender; CBA = Currency board.  
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Table A2: Controls of foreign exchange and capital account transactions in some African countries as of 1999 
 
Country Controls on FDI Banks borrowing 
abroad 
Limits on open foreign 
exchange position 
Resident accounts 
 Inward FDI 
 
Outward FDI   Held domestically Held abroad 
Angola Effective May 1999: 
- minimum of 
$60,000 for FDI 
- up to $25,000:  
central bank 
clearance required 
- above $25,000: 
government approval 
required 
Citizens allowed to 
invest abroad 
allowed Daily open position up 
to $500,000 for banks; 




source of funds 
Clearance needed for 
enterprises; no approval 
needed for individuals 
Benin Reporting required 
only for statistical 
purposes 
Subject to approval; 
maximum of 75% 










authorization by MOF 
and approval of the 
BCEAO 
Botswana n.a. No limits n.a. Overall limit of 30% of 
unimpaired bank’s 
capital 
No limits on 
amounts  
No restrictions 
Comoros Controlled  Subject to approval 
on underlying 
transactions 






Subject to license 
from central bank 
Subject to license 
from central bank 
Controlled  Ceiling for each bank 
authorized by central 
bank 
In authorized 
banks, no approval 
by central bank 
Allowed for public and 
semi-public enterprises, 
subject to central bank’s 
approval 
Egypt Nonbank foreign 
exchange dealers 
must be entirely 
Egyptian-owned 
n.a. n.a. Total foreign assets to 
total foreign liabilities 
not to exceed 105% 
Allowed  Allowed  
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Table A2 (continued): Controls of foreign exchange and capital account transactions in some African countries (1999) 
 
Country Controls on FDI Banks borrowing 
abroad 
Limits on open foreign 
exchange position 
Resident accounts 
 Inward FDI 
 
Outward FDI   Held domestically Held abroad 
Ethiopia Foreigners can hold up to 100% 
of share in any ventures, 
excluding banking, insurance, 
and transport; 
Investment restricted in some 
sectors; tax incentives for FDI.  
n.a. Subject to central 
bank’s authorization 
Maximum 15% of a bank’s 
capital at end of business day 






Gabon Minimum national shareholding 




n.a. n.a. Not allowed Allowed with 
prior approval 
Ghana Minimum amounts of: 
- $10,000 if joint venture with 
Ghanaian partner 
- $50,000 when wholly foreign-
owned 
- $300,000 if employs at least 10 
Ghanaians and wholly or partly 
foreign-owned. 
Approval on 
the basis of 
merit 
Allowed with prior 
notification of the 
central bank 
Allowed based on volume of 
foreign exchange transactions 
by banks; subject to periodic 
review  
Allowed  Permitted with 
prior approval 
Kenya No controls No controls No controls Allowed up to 20% of paid-up 
capital 
No controls No controls 
Mauritius Controlled  n.a. n.a. Daily maximum of 15% of 






Table A2 (continued): Controls of foreign exchange and capital account transactions in some African countries (1999) 
 
Country Controls on FDI Banks 
borrowing 
abroad 




 Inward FDI 
 
Outward FDI   Held domestically Held abroad 
Mozambique - initial capital 
repatriation guarantee 
- selective investment 
incentives  
 




Limits set in % of core 
capital 
Allowed  Opening must be 
reported to central 
bank 
Namibia Free inward transfers 
of capital for equity 
investment from non-
CMA countries  
Application considered 
on merit; limits of N$50 
million outside of 







Maximum of 15% of 
bank’s share capital 
and unimpaired 
reserves (residents and 
nonresidents) 






Nigeria No ceiling for foreign 
capital participation; 
restrictions in priority 
areas (crude oil and 
gas) 
n.a. n.a. With limits Allowed with 
authorized dealers 
Not allowed 
Seychelles Free, except for 
ownership of land 




South Africa n.a. Limits for companies: 
R250 million within 
SADC (no limit for 
CAM countries), R50 
million elsewhere; 





Maximum 15% of net 
qualifying capital and 
reserves 
Limited to R50,000 
for individuals; the 
max R750,000 
allowed FDI may be 








Table A2 (continued): Controls of foreign exchange and capital account transactions in some African countries (1999) 
 
Country Controls on FDI Banks borrowing 
abroad 




 Inward FDI Outward FDI   Held 
domestically 
Held abroad 
Tanzania Approval required; some areas 
restricted to public sectors, 
some to Tanzanian citizens 
Subject to approval by 
central bank 
Borrowing regulated, 
but banks permitted 
to operate credit 
lines with 
correspondents. 
Maximum 20% of 
core capital 
Allowed  For individuals no 
restrictions on money 
acquired abroad; for 
banks, no restrictions 
on operations with 
correspondents 
Tunisia Free in most sectors; approval 
required in some service 
sectors. 
Central bank’s approval 
required for transfers of 
capital; “free” (within 
limits) transfer of funds 
by exporters to cover 
installation, maintenance 
and operations costs of 
subsidiaries  
Free up to D10 
million 
Global limit of 
20% of bank’s net 
equity capital in 
all currencies 
(maximum of 





Subject to approval for 
individuals; free for 
resident banks 
Uganda No controls No controls n.a. Maximum 20% of 
core capital 
Allowed  Allowed  
Zambia No controls No controls No controls 
(reporting for 
statistical purposes) 
n.a. Allowed  Allowed  
Zimbabwe Approval by ZIC; maximum 
foreign-ownership: up to 
100% in  “priority sectors” 
(manufacturing, mining, 
hotels), 70% in specialized 
services; 35% as in partnership 
with nationals in “reserve 
sectors.” 





million or 10% of 
capital 
Allowed  Allowed, subject to 
prior approval 
 
Sources: IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2000. 
MOF = Ministry of Finance; BCEAO = Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (Central Bank of West African States); CMA = Common Monetary 
Area (Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland); SADC = Southern African Development Community; ZIC = Zimbabwe Investment Center. 
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Figure 1: Capital flows to Africa: volume and share in developing countries 
 











































































































































Note: SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; DC = Developing Countries 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance (1997 and 2000); For FDI: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (1998, 2000) and UNCTAD 
(1995). Foreign Direct Investment in Africa. 
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Figure 2: Rates of return on United States FDI, 1980-1997 (per cent)* 
 





























Sources: UCTAD (1995). FDI in Africa; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1998. 
* The rate of return is net income of US foreign affiliates divided by the average of the beginning-of-year 
and end-of-year FDI stock. 

















































































Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (various issues, 1992 to 2000). 
Nominal values are deflated to real values using the US PPI index (base 1995=100). 
 
 64
Figure 5: Exchange rate regime transition in Africa and other regions from 1991 to 1999 
(number of countries by regime and share in the sample) 
 





























































































Source: Fisher, S. (2001) "Exchange rate regimes: Is the bipolar view correct?", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2): 3-24.  
Notes: EM = emerging markets; IC = Developed Countries. 






Capital account and foreign exchange regimes:  




a. Capital flows 
Egypt experienced a surge in capital inflows over the 1990s decade, which were motivated 
primarily by the increased confidence by foreign investors in the Egyptian economy following 
economic reform.  Noteworthy developments include successful fiscal adjustment and the curbing 
of inflation, which, under a relatively liberal capital account regime contributed to this surge of 
capital inflows. 
However, the surge in capital inflows has raised some concerns with regard to their impact 
on the stability and the performance of the economy, especially because high capital inflows cause 
pressure on the exchange rate, which undermines export performance.   
 
b. Exchange rate regime 
The exchange rate regime in Egypt has undergone significant shifts in the early 1990s.  
Starting in 1969, Egypt instituted a system of multiple exchange rates and maintained an “official” 
parallel market to attract workers’ remittances and encourage tourism.  The exchange rate policies 
pursued in the 1970s and the 1980s resulted in substantial appreciation of the Egyptian pound and 
undermined export competitiveness. 
As part of the reform program, the government established a free market for foreign 
exchange for current account transactions in 1991, and eased capital account restrictions further in 
1992. The real exchange rate continued to appreciate after 1991, partly as a result of nominal 
appreciation and partly as a result of the differential in inflation between Egypt and its trading 
partners (see Subramanian and Handy 1997 and Mongardini 1998).  There is no evidence to 
suggest that the real appreciation reflected productivity gains.  The country did not experience any 
improvement in trade performance.  In fact non-oil exports declined at the end of the decade.   
The appreciation of the Egyptian pound may continue in the future if capital inflows 
continue (keeping reserves high).  Debt forgiveness and debt rescheduling may further improve the 
external reserves position, thus contributing to further real exchange rate appreciation. 
 
c. The financial system 
The Egyptian stock market is one of the oldest stock markets in the world.  However, the 
stock exchange was largely dormant for over four decades following the policy shifts of the 1950s 
with the nationalization of industry and the adoption of central planning (Mecagni and Sourial 
1999).  The 1990s saw a marked expansion of the stock market, with an increase in the number of 
listed companies, market capitalization, and liquidity.  Much improvement is still needed, however, 
to provide an environment that allows the capital market to channel and allocate resources 
efficiently, especially by enforcing information disclosure by firms and by strengthening the legal 





a. Symptoms of a crisis at the end of the 1980s 
Towards the end of the 1980s (especially starting in 1987), the Kenyan economy showed 
signs of a pending crisis.  Real GDP slowed down from an already weak position.  The budget 
deficit was high (about 6% of GDP in 1987), and inflation rose from 4.8% in 1986 to 7.6% in 1987 
and continued to climb in the following years.  At the same time, the policy stance was 
characterized by high regulation in foreign exchange markets, trade, and the financial system 
(differential credit ceilings, interest rate controls, and political intrusion in credit allocation).  By 
the end of the decade, it was clear that in the absence of major reforms, economic collapse was 
inevitable.  Here, only policy reforms in the areas of foreign exchange markets, current and capital 
accounts are summarized (see Ariyoshi et al. 2000 and Krichene 1998 for further details on recent 
policy reforms in Kenya). 
 
b. Recent important policy reforms in exchange rates, current account and capital account 
- In 1989, Kenya began the process of liberalization of the financial system.  Interest rate ceilings 
were gradually removed and interest rates fully liberalized by 1991. 
- In 1991, the liberalization of current and capital accounts was initiated with the introduction of 
“foreign exchange bearer certificates of deposits”, which could be used in current and capital 
account transactions.  These certificates were available for residents and nonresidents, they were 
freely traded in the secondary market, and redeemed at the central bank at the face value. 
- Since 1991, some companies were allowed to hold foreign currency-denominated bank accounts 
abroad and domestically.  Banks were allowed to conduct transactions in foreign exchange directly.  
Forward foreign exchange contracts were allowed at market rates albeit with some restrictions on 
the amount and the term. 
- In 1993 (4th quarter), the exchange rate regime shifted from a currency composite peg to an 
independently floating regime. 
- In 1994, the Kenyan shilling became fully convertible. 
- In 1995, all remaining exchange controls were removed.  Also removed were restrictions on 
purchases of shares and government securities by nonresidents.   
 
c. Crisis amidst (speedy) liberalization  
Despite the liberalization efforts, the crisis that had started at the end of the 1980s continued 
throughout the 1990s.  Inflation rose from 19.8% in 1991 to 45% in 1993.  It started declining in 
1994 and dropped to single-digit levels again later in the decade (5.8% in 1998).   
 Due to the continued deterioration of the economic situation, the government moved in, 
tightening monetary policy and fiscal policy.  However, the tight policy stance may have 
contributed to suffocating an already weak economy by undermining domestic demand.  
Liberalization in Kenya did not achieve the intended objectives of stabilizing the economy and 
boosting production.  An IMF study concludes that “rapid and wide-ranging liberalization in the 
context of continued major macroeconomic imbalances may have increased the country’s 
vulnerability to capital flows by providing legal channels for capital flight (the latter reflecting both 







a. Exchange rate and capital account regimes 
Until May 2000, Malawi had actively managed its foreign exchange markets, which 
resulted in large depreciation of the kwacha as well as severe distortions of economic incentives 
(IMF 2001).  The country data indicate large depreciations of the kwacha, especially in 1994, in 
1998 (by 40%), and in 2000 (by another 40%).  Even in periods of relative stability of the exchange 
rate (between 1994 and 1998), high inflation rates led to substantial real depreciation of the 
currency.   
May 2000 marked a major policy shift, when the central bank stopped quoting an explicit 
exchange rate and reduced substantially its intervention for exchange rate determination purposes, 
making the exchange rate fully flexible. 
 Since 1995, Malawi has moved towards liberalization of capital account transactions.  For 
example, nonresidents are allowed to repatriate investment proceeds without restrictions (only 
registration for statistical purposes is required). 
 
b. Implications of membership in regional arrangements 
 Malawi is a member of various regional bodies, including the SADC, COMESA, and the 
Cross-Border Initiative in Eastern and Southern Africa, or CBI (see Fajgenbaum 1999).  Malawi is 
one of the best performing participants in the CBI and COMESA with respect to trade 
liberalization.  One important issue is that membership in various regional bodies can produce 
distorted economic incentives and create administrative problems when obligations under the 
various bodies are inconsistent.   
A structural constraint for Malawi is its weak productive capacity, which limits the gains 
from multilateral arrangements.  Another important constraint is poor development of its financial 
system.  The banking sector is heavily concentrated, with the two largest banks accounting for 90 
percent of deposits.  These banks lend to a limited number of companies, many of which own large 
shares of the banks’ capital.  This promotes insider lending, which results in an inefficient 




a. Exchange rate regime 
Over the years, Nigeria applied a variety of foreign exchange arrangements, including fixed 
official exchange rates, market-determined exchange rates, dual systems of fixed official rates, and 
rates based on interbank exchange (IMF 1998).  Before 1986 (the beginning of structural 
adjustment), the official rate was fixed without any link to the market rate or inflation, resulting in 
a high premium.  After 1986, the government pursued a de facto indexation of the official exchange 
rate by adjusting the official exchange rate in response to changes in parallel market to prevent the 
premium from being too large.  The evidence shows that the official and parallel exchange rates 
moved together after 1986 (Azam 1999). 
With the “abandonment” of the adjustment program in 1994, the Nigerian government 
reinstated – among other controls – foreign exchange controls with an artificially fixed exchange 
rate.  However, by the end of 1994, it was clear that attempts to stabilize the Naira by 
administrative means had failed.  In 1995, the government made a turnaround, resuming the 
economic liberalization program.  Since then the government has pursued policies aimed at 
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allowing the exchange rates to reflect market conditions while using monetary policy to contain 
pressures on foreign exchange markets.  In January 1999, the government abolished the official 
exchange rate (fixed at 22 Naira per dollar since 1993), and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
gradually shifted its intervention from weekly allocation of foreign exchange through the 
Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market (AFEM) to exclusive reliance on continuous buying and 
selling in the Interbank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM).  This has eliminated the multiple 
exchange rates arising from the spread between the rates in the two markets.   
 
b. Liberalization of the capital account  
Since 1995, Nigeria has embarked on a process of liberalization of controls of capital 
movements.  The following are some of the recent measures intended to encourage foreign capital 
inflows: 
- The Foreign Exchange Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions Decree of July 1995 
(retroactively effective January 1995) permitted individuals and businesses to invest in any firm 
through an accredited dealer in the AFEM. 
- Guaranteed transferability in convertible currency for dividends, profits, debt service, and 
proceeds of whole or partial sale or liquidation of initial investment. 
- Nationals are allowed to invest in securities abroad, provided proper documentation.  However, 
nationals are not permitted to simply make deposits abroad, as officials are concerned that this may 
be a conduit for capital flight. 
- Earlier “indigenization” measures that required majority Nigerian ownership of foreign 
enterprises have been abolished.  There are no limits to foreigners’ participation in any sector of the 
economy, except for crude oil and gas. 
 The authorities still face two interrelated and serious issues, namely high debt burden and 
capital flight.  There is evidence of progress in economic reform, which will contribute to 
improving the overall macroeconomic environment.  The country has especially embarked on a 
comprehensive reform program of the financial system aimed at strengthening the regulatory and 
supervision framework (e.g., higher independence of the CBN) and improving the stability of the 
banking sector (through enforcement of capital adequacy rules and systematic monitoring of 
banks).  These measures, coupled with improvements in political stability, are likely to improve 
investor confidence, which will attract more capital into the country. 
 
5. South Africa 
 
a. Turbulence in financial markets and foreign exchange markets 
The South African foreign exchange market and the financial system suffered the effects of 
the Asian financial crisis in mid-1998.  Deterioration in investor sentiment caused substantial 
capital outflows and a depreciation of the Rand.  The authorities responded by tightening monetary 
policy and by intervening in the foreign exchange market (IMF 2000).  The financial turbulence 
receded at the end of 1998 and the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) allowed interest rates to 
decline.  Low inflation expectations and prudent fiscal policy contributed to rejuvenating market 
confidence, causing a substantial return of international capital. 
 
b. Liberalization of the capital account 
 Since 1994, the South African government committed to progressively abolishing controls 
on capital account transactions.  The liberalization covered transactions by nonresidents as well as 
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residents, banks and nonfinancial firms, private and public enterprises, and private individuals.  
Some of the important changes since 1995 are the following: 
- Dismantlement of restrictions on capital account and foreign exchange transactions by residents 
and nonresidents.  Nonresidents were allowed to purchase shares, bonds, and other assets, and to 
repatriate dividends, interest receipts, profits as well as initial investment capital with little or no 
restrictions. 
- Restrictions on exchange transactions by residents were substantially relaxed.  While capital and 
current account transactions by residents are subject to quantitative restrictions, the quantitative 
caps have been progressively raised, and some have been abolished. 
- Note, however, that the authorities maintain prudential regulation on foreign exchange by 
authorized dealers with no quantitative limits. 
- Investment abroad by residents is allowed within some limits.  For corporations, the limit is R250 
million for investment within the SADC region (no limits for Namibia, Lesotho, and Swaziland, 
which are member of the Common Monetary Area) and R50 million elsewhere.  Institutional 
investors are allowed to invest up to 15% of their assets abroad.  Private individuals can invest up 
to R750,000 abroad. 
 
c. Foreign exchange policy: the “forward Book” 
 The SARB has intervened in the foreign exchange market since the 1960s.  The Bank has 
often maintained a large net open forward position (NOFP) whereby the Bank’s forward US dollar 
liabilities exceed its forward dollar assets.  The official objective of this policy is to absorb 
speculative pressures on the Rand, preventing sharp depreciations and mitigating the increases in 
the interest rate.  The objective is not to defend a predetermined value of the Rand but to ease the 
(market-driven) adjustment of the exchange rate.   
 The experience of the 1990s suggest that the effectiveness of the SARB’s intervention in 
the foreign exchange market in dampening pressures on the exchange rate was minimal and short-
lived at best.  In contrast, the evidence tends to support the view that high NOFPs lead to higher 
risk premia on investment in South Africa, as the market calls into question the ability of the SARB 




a. Exchange rate regime 
 The Ugandan government has committed to moving toward liberal foreign exchange and 
trade regimes.  In particular, the government committed to not resisting fluctuations in the 
exchange rate due to changes in economic fundamentals.  It is committed to supporting 
liberalization of the foreign exchange regime with appropriate fiscal and monetary policies.  
Recently the Ugandan shilling has been relatively more stable compared to the 1980s and early 
1990s and compared to neighboring countries (Krichene 1998). 
 
b. Promoting a capital-friendly environment  
The Ugandan government has been noted for its commitment to pursuing macroeconomic 
policy reforms (especially fiscal and monetary policies).  This will allow the government to 
establish policy credibility and achieve macroeconomic stability, which attracts new private foreign 
capital.  The government also has pursued policies aimed at strengthening the financial system, 
including privatization of state-owned banks, enhancing banking supervision and regulation 
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(including granting increased autonomy to the central bank), restructuring and recapitalization of 
weak banks, and the establishment of capital market infrastructure.  Evidence of credible 
commitment to economic reform and improvement in the macroeconomic environment will 
increase investor confidence and stimulates capital inflows. 
 
7. The CFA zone 
 
a. Origins 
The CFA zone is a creation of the political and economic relations between France and its former 
West African and Central African colonies.  In the 1930s and 1940s, France established currencies 
in its colonies that were pegged on the French franc (FF).  At the end of the second world war, 
these currencies were consolidated into the Franc des Colonies Françaises d’Afrique (thus CFA).  
Until the end of colonization, the currency was issued by the Caisse Centrale de la France d’Outre 
Mer.  After independence, the two regional central banks of the CFA zone, the Banque Centrale 
des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) and the Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale 
(BEAC) took over the issuance of the CFA. 
 
The current membership of the CFA zone comprises 14 countries, including 12 former French 
colonies and 2 new members, Equatorial Guinea (since 1985) and Guinea-Bissau (since 1997).  
The zone comprises two regions: eight west African states (Benin, Burkina-Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) and six central African states (Cameroon, the 
Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon).  The first 
group of countries belongs to the West African Monetary Union (WAMU) and the second belongs 
to the Central African Monetary Area (CAMA).   
 
b. Exchange rate and monetary arrangements  
The two regional central banks operate independently and issue two separate CFA currencies: the 
franc de la Communauté Financière de l’Afrique and the franc de la Coopération Financière 
Africaine.  But since the two currencies have the same parity to the FF, they are equivalent for all 
practical purposes and the zone is in fact a common currency area.  Any decision to change the 
parity of the currencies requires the unanimous support of all members of the entire zone.  
 
The parity of the CFA to the FF was established in October 1948 at 0.5 CFA per FF.  However, in 
1968 the parity was adjusted following the introduction of a new FF equivalent to 100 of old FF.  
The value of the CFA relative to the FF did not change, but its absolute value was raised to 50 CFA 
per FF.  Following continued deterioration of economic conditions in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
the CFA, which had been overvalued for years, was finally devaluated by 50% in February 1994.   
 
The CFA is fully convertible and there is free capital mobility between the two regions and France.  
Full convertibility of the CFA is guaranteed by the French Treasury, rather than the Central Bank 
of France.  Therefore, the arrangement is of a budgetary rather than monetary nature.  This feature 
facilitated the shift of the parity from the FF to the euro at the creation of the EMU, as it did not 
require the approval by other members of the EMU.  This shift has left the operating structures of 
the CFA zone and the relationships between the group and France fundamentally unchanged.  The 
current fixed rate is 100 CFAF per 0.8385 euro.  For further details on the CFA zone and the 
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implications of the EMU, see, among others, Hadjimichael and Galy (1997) and Honohan and Lane 
(2000). 
 
Under the fixed exchange regime zone member countries have been able to maintain inflations 
rates that are lower than other comparable sub-Saharan African countries.  However price stability 
was achieved at significant costs.  The inability to adjust the exchange rate has resulted in higher 
sensitivity of economic growth to real shocks, especially terms-of-trade fluctuations.  Most 
observers conclude that CFA zone countries would have been better off having flexibility to use 
exchange rate adjustments in the presence of external shocks (see Savvides 1996). 
 
 
